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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON
and JOAN NICHOLSON, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
Appellants,
vs.
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants,
Respondents.
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S:.l.TE OF lDAHO
COUH iY OF SHOSHOHE/SS
f"!LED

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 N orthwtst Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184

2015 FEB -9 PM 3: 12
PEGGY WHITE
BYC~

OtPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-375
AFFIDAVIT OF THERON J. DE SMET
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )
Theron J. De Smet, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney of record for the defendants, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining

Corp. ("CDA PLACER") and IFG Timber, LLC ("IFG") in this matter. I have personal
knowledge of the matters forth in this affidavit and I am competent to testify to the matters
herein.
2.

I submit this Affidavit in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary

~J~~~;_~-DE

SMET~ S~~O~T OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION F0[5

2

Judgment.
3.

On December 17, 2014, I served Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories,

Requests for Production and Request for Admission on plaintiffs ("Discovery"). On January
23, 2015, Plaintiffs answered and responded to the Discovery. A true and correct copy of
plaintiffs' answers and responses to the Discovery are attached as Exhibit A.
4.

In response to the Discovery, plaintiffs produced a Land Lease executed on

August 28, 1995, between the plaintiffs and CDA Placer. A true and correct copy of the Land
Lease is attached as Exhibit B.
5.

In response to the Discovery, plaintiffs produced various correspondence

between CDA Placer and plaintiffs. The correspondence and cancelled checks demonstrate
CDA Placer and plaintiffs agreed to and renewed the Land Lease. True and correct copies of
the correspondence and cancelled checks are attached as Exhibit C.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6th day of February 2015.

AFFIDAVIT OF THERON J. DE SMET IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FORr:,:,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
l JJ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.

.

I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

X US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 752-1900

AFFIDAVIT OF THERON J. DE SMET IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAL~TS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-3
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EXHIBIT A

JAMES McMILLAN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900
ISB # 7523
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Case No.

CV-14-375

DEFENDANTS' INTERROGATORIES,
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,

vs.
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,

AND PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES AND
ANSWERS THERETO

Defendants and Counter-claimant

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W.

MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON

(hereinafter "Counter-

defendants"), by and through their Counsel of Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law,
and hereby respond to Defendants' Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and
Requests for Admission as follows:

INTERROGATORIES

RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY - 1

·

EXHIBIT_A_

15G

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state the name, address and telephone number of each and
every person known to plaintiffs or their attorney who have any knowledge, or who purports to
have any knowledge, of any of the facts of this case. By this Interrogatory, we seek the names,
addresses and telephone numbers of all witnesses who have any knowledge of any facts pertinent
to damages and/or liability.
ANSWER:

1-2

W. Michael and Joan Nicholson
c/o James McMillan, Esq.
Attorney at Law, P.L.L.C.
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
(208) 752-1800

3.

Dr. Elizabeth Gardner
President, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
Contact infotmation in the possession of Defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer

4.

Robert Boyd
[address to be supplemented]

5.

Kevin Boling
204 E. Sherman
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 667-4643

6.

Henry Odegard
42 Eagle Creek Road
Wallace, ID 83873

7.

Daniel Frigard
Same as Henry Odegard above.

8.

Janna Peronto, BLM Real Estate Specialist
Coeur d'Alene, ID office

9.

Dan Martensen
Shoshone County Planning and Zoning
700 Bank Street
Wallace, Idaho 83873
(208) 752-8891

10.

Robert Decker

RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY - 2
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25 5 Whitetail Loop
Kingston, Idaho 83839
(208) 682-4300
11.

12.

Marvin Mendenhal
24145 Coeur d'Alene River Rd
Wallace, Idaho 83873
(telephone number to be supplemented)
Larry Domingo

380 Eagle Creek Rd.
Wallace, ID 83873
(telephone number to be supplemented)
13.

David Miller
6352 Prichard Creek Rd
P.O. Box 396
Murray, ID 83874

14

Francis A. Gitter
3225 West Eighth St. Apt. 43
Yuma, AZ 85364
(telephone number to be supplemented)

15-16. Ron and Linda Hines
W. Eagle Creek Rd.
Wallace, ID 83873
(telephone number to be supplemented)
17.

Mike Plummer
187 Prichard St.,
Wallace, ID 83873

18.

William Hale
183 Prichard St.
Wallace, ID 83873

19.

Western River Conservancy
Rob Griffith, Corporate Counsel,
71 SW Oak St., Suite 100
Portland, Oregon
(503) 241-0151 ext. 222

Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this Answer as additional infommtion becomes
available, and will abide by the Court's pretrial order with regard to the disclosure of witnesses,

RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY - 3
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once it is issued.
INTERROGATORY N0.2: For each person identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 1,

please provide the substance of the knowledge possessed by the person.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs may be called to testify as to their personal knowledge as to the

allegations in the Complaint and Counterclaim.
Elizabeth Gardner is an agent of Defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer, and was present
during, and participated in, the communications between herself and her late husband as agents
of Coeur d'Alene Placer, and Plaintiffs.
Robert Boyd was also present with Elizabeth Gardner during her meetings with Plaintiffs,
and is believed to have knowledge with regard to the allegations raised in the Complaint and
Counterclaim related to the property subject to this case.
Kevin Boling was the real estate agent believed to be handling the transactions with
regard to the property owned by Coeur d'Alene Placer and may be called to testify with regard to
his knowledge of the same, in addition to his alleged communications with Plaintiffs.
Henry Odegard and Daniel Frigard are believed to have purchased a neighboring parcel
from Coeur d'Alene Placer which were similarly leasing. Moreover, Odegard has a long history
of harassment against Plaintiffs and other neighboring residents, and has represented himself as
an agent of Coeur d'Alene Placer.
Janna Peronto is believed to have knowledge of a transaction between Coeur d'Alene
Placer and the Bureau of Land Management which was pending prior to the sale to Defendant
IFG, involving the same property.
Dan Martinsen is believed to have knowledge of activities and improvements that took
place on the properties then-owned by Coeur d'Alene Placer.
Robert Decker had leased nearby real prope1iy from Coeur d'Alene Placer, while Mr.
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY - 4

1 ~·r; av

ANSWER:

'

Plaintiffs have not identified any experts at this time. Plaintiffs reserve the right

to supplement this Answer as additional information becomes available, and will abide by the
Court's pretrial order with regard to the disclosure of witnesses, once it is issued.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please set forth the sum and substance of each statement, whether
oral, written or recorded by any means of the defendants or any agents, representatives or
employees of the defendants that pertains in any manner to the events in issue in this case.

ANSWER:

Wilfred Gardner, then President of Coeur d'Alene Placer, and Elizabeth Gardner,

current President of Coeur d'Alene Placer and wife of Wilfred Gardner, would visit Plaintiffs
during the second week in July, from 1995 until approximately 2009 (Wifred until his death, and
Elizabeth until 2009).

During these informal meetings, the Gardners would often state to

Plaintiffs that, in the event that Coeur d'Alene Placer decided to sell the property Plaintiffs were
currently occupying, Coeur d'Alene Placer would either purchase the buildings for their assessed
value, or give Plaintiffs the first opportunity to purchase the land.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If you are aware of any statement whether oral, recorded, written,
or otherwise made by any person or entity regarding the matters alleged in the Complaint or
Counterclaim or any matter connected therewith, please state the name and address of the person
making the statement, a summary of the statement, and, if applicable, the means by which the
statement is preserved (e.g., writing, tape recording, etc.), and the name and address of each
person or entity having possession of the original or a copy of the statement preserved.

ANSWER:

Wilfred Gardner and Elizabeth Gardner were present, with both Plaintiffs. Robert

Boyd was also present during some of the meetings between the Gardners and Plaintiffs.
Defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer is believed to be in possession of the current addresses and
telephone numbers of Elizabeth Gardner and Robert Boyd.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-335, please set forth in detail a full
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and complete itemization of all general and special damages claimed by you in this action,
including the date and amount thereof, a brief description of the damage, and the name and
address of the person or entity most knowledgeable regarding said damage.

ANSWER:

Plaintiffs have not yet completed the compilation of this information, and will

supplement this response once is is available.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7: In paragraph 2.5 of the Complaint, you allege "... an officer and
agent of Coeur d'Alene Placer, stated to Plaintiffs that, in the event that Coeur d'Alene Placer
elected to sell the Property, Plaintiffs would have a right of first refusal to purchase the Property
which they were leasing." Please identify in full and complete detail the specific terms of the
"right of first refusal," including, but not limited to the following:
a.

The purchase price or compensation to be given for the "right of first refusal" or

purchase of the property;
b.

The common and legal description of the real property subject to the "right of

first
refusal";
c.

All improvements or personal property subject to the "right of first refusal";

d. Any and all consideration given or exchanged between the parties for the "right of
first refusal";
e.

All other essential or relevant terms or conditions of the "right of first refusal";

f.

The persons agreeing to any or all of the foregoing terms and conditions of the

and

"right of first refusal" and the date and location of such.

ANSWER:

a.

No specific dollar amount was discussed.

b.

No legal description was specified, but it was mutually understood that it
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would be the property currently used and occupied°by Plaintiffs. ·
c.

The buildings/personal property are already owned by Plaintiffs.

Additional improvements include placing an existing well into operation with a pump and wellhouse, removing large amounts of rubbish and 'junk," restoring a garden plot, and general
maintenance to the land and buildings.
d.

None other than continued maintenance of the property

e.

See Interrogatory No. 4 above.

f.

Wilfred and Elizabeth Gardner in their capacities as agents and officers of

Coeur d'Alene Placer, at the location of Plaintiffs 1 residence during the summers of 1995 through

2009.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: In paragraph 2.6 of the Complaint, you allege an officer and agent
of Coeur d'Alene Placer "... represented to Plaintiffs that, in the event that Coeur d1Alene Placer
elected to terminate the Lease, Coeur d'Alene Placer would purchase the buildings from
Plaintiffs. 11 Please identify in full and complete detail the specific terms of the alleged agreement,
including, but not limited to the following:
a.

The purchase price or compensation to be given for the buildings;

b.

The manner the buildings are identified in the agreement;

c.

All real or personal property included in the agreement;

d.

Any and all consideration given or exchanged between the parties for the

agreement;
e.

All other essential or relevant terms or conditions of the agreement; and

f.

The persons agreeing to any or all of the foregoing terms and conditions of the

agreement and the date and location of such.

ANSWER:

a.

The assessed value at the the time of sale, plus the value of the
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improvements thereto;
b.

The buildings owned by Plaintiffs located upon the land owned by Coeur

d'Alene Placer;
c.

Same as b. above;

d.

None other than continued maintenance of the property and payment of

annual rents to Coeur d'Alene Placer. The amount discussed in a. above would be paid to
Plaintiffs at the time of sale;
e.

See Interrogatory No. 4 above.

f.

Wilfred and Elizabeth Gardner in their capacities as agents and officers of

Coeur d'Alene Placer, at the location of Plaintiffs' residence during the summers of 1995 through
2009.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9: In paragraph 6.2 of the Complaint, you allege "during Plaintiff's
tenancy, Plaintiff has made improvements and conducted maintenance of the Property, with the
knowledge and permission of Defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer." Please specifically identify each
and every improvement or maintenance you have made to the Property and each and every fact
upon which plaintiffs rely to support such allegations.

ANSWER:

Maintenance and improvements to the buildings. Placement of an existing well

into operation with a pump and well-house, removing large amounts of rubbish and "junk,"
restoring a garden plot, and general maintenance to the land and buildings.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In paragraph 6.2 of the Complaint, you allege Coeur d'Alene
Placer had knowledge of and gave permission to plaintiffs to make improvements and maintain
the Property. Please set forth each and every fact upon which plaintiffs rely or tend to rely to
support such allegations, including, but not limited to the names of Coeur d'Alene Placer's agents
or representatives that had knowledge of and gave permission for such and the dates of the same.
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ANSWER:

The Gardners personally viewed and gave their approval of the improvements

during their visits to the property as set forth above.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify all consideration given by plaintiffs for the
purchase of the buildings on the Property.
ANSWER:

Objection.

This Interrogatory seeks information that is neither relevant, nor

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in this matter.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please specifically identify the value of the buildings on the
Property and the amount of increase in the fair market value of the Property that is attributable to
the building and each and every fact upon which plaintiffs rely or tend to rely to support their
position.
ANSWER:

Approximately $27,000 to 29,000. Plaintiffs will supplement this response once

they are able to obtain a formal appraisal.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please specifically identify plaintiffs' version of their
interaction(s) with Kevin Boling in April of 2012.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs deny that the alleged "interaction(s) with Kevin Boling in April of

2012" ever took place.

INTERROGATORY NO. 14: In paragraph 4.3 of the Complaint, you allege "Plaintiffs relied
upon these promises by continuing to reside upon the Property, maintain and improve the
property, and continue to renew the lease." Please identify each and every fact upon which
plaintiffs rely or tend to rely to supp011 such allegations.
ANSWER:

This allegation is self-explanatory, and the improvements are discussed

hereinabove.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If your answer to any of the Requests for Admission, served
contemporaneously herewith, are anything but an unequivocal admission, please specifically
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'state, for each such answer, each and every fact upon which plaintiffs rely in answering the
Request.

ANSWER:

With regard to all Requests for Admission referring to Plaintiffs' interactions and

discussions with Kevin Boling, Plaintiffs deny that Plaitniff Joan Nicholson ever engaged in any
discussions with Mr. Boling. Further:
Request for Admission No. 3:

While there was a general reference to an

"opportunity to purchase" contained in a letter from Boling, there was nothing further discussed
or set forth that would constitute an offer from Coeur d'Alene Placer to purchase the property.
Request for Admission No. 4:

In a letter from Coeur d'Alene Placer to Plaintiffs,

Coeur d'Alene Placer stated that Boling would be contacting Plaintiffs to "discuss [their]
options," and made reference to a possible to arrangement of a sale. However, their was no firm
offer made, and Plaintiffs received no contact from Boling until December of that year.
Request for Admission No. 5:

There was no offer contained in the July 17 letter.

Request for Admission No. 6:

Plaintiffs admit that there were discussion regarding

the purchase of the lot, but deny that there was ever and actual offer made.
Request for Admission No. 24:

Plaintiffs assert that no demand was made for rent,

and that they were not given the opportunity to arrange for payment of rent following July 1,
2014.
Request for Admission No. 25:

Plaintiffs admit that there is no formal rental

agreement currently in place.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION N0.1: Each and every document, exhibit or item of tangible
evidence plaintiffs intend to introduce at the trial of this matter.

RESPONSE: See attached.
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY - 11

165

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:· Any and all photographs, drawings, receipts,

invoices, bills, cancelled checks, evidence of payments received, account statements or other
representations relating to the subject of this lawsuit.
RESPONSE: See attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: All documents and correspondence, including

electronically stored information such as e-mails, e-mail attachments and drafts of documents,
concerning any representation made by plaintiffs or defendants regarding the allegations in
Complaint or the transactions or occurrences upon which the Complaint is based.
RESPONSE: See attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Any and all reports prepared by persons who have

been used as consultants by plaintiffs in this action.
RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION N0.5:

Any and all reports prepared or used by persons

who may or will testify as expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiffs at the trial of this action.
RESPONSE: None at this time.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Any and all statements obtained from persons with

knowledge of the subject matter of this lawsuit.
RESPONSE: None at this time.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce a copy of each and every lease

agreement and amendment or modification to such, as identified in the Complaint.
RESPONSE: See attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: In paragraph 2.5 of the Complaint, you allege

11

...

an

officer and agent of Coeur d'Alene Placer, stated to Plaintiffs that, in the event that Coeur d'Alene
Placer elected to sell the Property, Plaintiffs would have a right of first refusal to purchase the
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Property which they were leasing." Please produced a· copy of each and every document upon
which Plaintiffs rely or tend to rely to support such allegations, including a copy of any "right of
first refusal."

RESPONSE: None in Plaintiffs' possession.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: In paragraph 2.6 of the Complaint, you allege Coeur
d'Alene Placer "represented to Plaintiffs that, in the event that Coeur d'Alene Placer elected to
terminate the Lease, Coeur d'Alene Placer would purchase the buildings from Plaintiffs." Please
produced a copy of each and every document upon which plaintiffs rely or tend to rely to support
such allegations, including any supporting contractual agreements.

RESPONSE: None in Plaintiffs' possession.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Please produce a copy of each and every

document plaintiffs maintain authorizes them to reside on or maintain possession of the Property.

RESPONSE: None in Plaintiffs' possession.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce a copy of each and every document
that evidences that plaintiffs have paid rent to reside on or possess the Property from July 1, 2014
to present.

RESPONSE: None in Plaintiffs' possession.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce a copy of each and every document
upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 6.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Please produce a copy of each and every

document upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 9.

RESPONSE: None.
·REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:
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document upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 10.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce a copy of each and every document
upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 11.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16:

Please produce a copy of each and every

document upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 12.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce a copy of each and every document
upon which plaintiffs rely or tends to rely upon in answering Interrogatory No. 14.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:

If your answer to any of the Requests for

Admission, served contemporaneously herewith, are anything but an unequivocal admission,
please produced, for each such answer, a copy of each and every document upon which plaintiffs
rely in answering the Request.

RESPONSE: None.
REQUESTS FORADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:

Please admit that in April 2012, Kevin Boling

informed plaintiffs that Coeur d'Alene Placer intended to sell its land, including land leased to
the plaintiffs.

ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.2:

Please admit that in April 2012, Kevin Boling

informed plaintiffs that Coeur d'Alene Placer was offering plaintiffs the opportunity to purchase
their leased home site.
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ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.3:

Please admit that on December 10, 2013, Kevin

Boling informed plaintiffs that Coeur d'Alene Placer was offering plaintiffs the opportunity to
purchase their leased home site.

ANSWER: Conditional denial (see Answer to Interrogatory No. 15)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.4: Please admit on June 17, 2013, Coeur d'Alene Placer
notified plaintiffs that Coeur d'Alene Placer intended to sell its land, including land leased the
plaintiffs.

ANSWER: Conditional denial (see Answer to Interrogatory No. 15).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Please admit on June 17, 2013, Coeur d'Alene Placer
notified plaintiffs that Coeur d'Alene Placer was offering plaintiffs the opportunity to
purchase their leased home site.

ANSWER: Deny
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Please admit Coeur d'Alene Placer offered to allow
plaintiffs to purchase their leased home site.

ANSWER: Conditional admission (see Answer to Interrogatory No. 15).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.7: Please admit plaintiffs did not offer to purchase their
leased home site from Coeur d'Alene Placer.

ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Please admit that plaintiffs did not offer to purchase
their leased home site from Coeur d'Alene Placer other than for annual rent already paid.

ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Please admit that no written "right of first refusal"
exists, as alleged in the Complaint.
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ANSWER: Plaintiffs admit that they have no written "right of first refusal" in their possession,
but have no knowledge as to what documents concerning the property may be in Defendants'
possession.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit IFG was not a party to the "right of first
refusal" alleged in the Complaint.
ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Please admit IFG was not a party to the alleged
agreement to purchase the buildings on the Property in the event of termination of the lease.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Please admit plaintiffs are not asserting a cause of
action against IFG for breach of contract.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Please admit that IFG is not liable to plaintiffs for
plaintiffs breach of contract claim.
ANSWER:

Objection. This request calls for a legal conclusion.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Please admit plaintiffs are not asserting a cause of
action against IFG for promissory estoppel.
ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Please admit that IFG is not liable to plaintiffs for
plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim.
ANSWER: Objection. This request calls for a legal conclusion.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16: Please admit plaintiffs are not asserting a cause of
action against IFG for specific perfo1mance.
ANSWER:

Admit.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Please admit that IFG is not liable io plaintiffs for
plaintiffs' claim for specific performance.

ANSWER:

Objection. This request calls for a legal conclusion.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Please admit plaintiffs did not advise IFG that they
were making improvements to or maintaining the Property.

ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Please admit IFG did not give plaintiffs pennission to
make any improvements to or maintain the Property.

ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Please admit that plaintiffs do not have any contract
withIFG.

ANSWER: Objection. This request calls for a legal conclusion.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Please admit plaintiffs are the legal owners of the
buildings on the Property.

ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Please admit plaintiffs can remove the buildings from
the Property.

ANSWER:

Deny

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Please admit defendants are not the legal owners of the
buildings on the Property.

ANSWER: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Please admit plaintiffs have not paid rent to reside on
or possess the Property from July 1, 2014 to present.

ANSWER: Conditional admission (see answer to Interrogatory No. 15.)
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Please admit plaintiffs do not have a· rental agreement

that entitles them to reside on or possess the Property from July 1, 2014 to present.
ANSWER: Conditional admission (see answer to Interrogatory No. 15.)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that any lease agreement plaintiffs had to

reside on or possess the Property was validly terminated.
ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Please admit that any lease agreement plaintiffs had to

reside on or possess the Property was terminated on June 30, 2014.
ANSWER:

Deny

DATED this 23d day of January, 2015
JAMES McMILLAN,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23d day of January, 2015; I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden
Theron Desmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.

P.O. Box 1336

_K_ U.S. Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884 (without
attached docwnents).

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants
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LAND LEASE
1.
PARTIES; LEASED PROPERTY. COEUR o•ALENE PLACER MINING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, having an office c/o Wilfred E. Gardner PC, 20
William Street, Suite 120, Wellesley, MA 02181-4102, ('1LANDLORD 11 , which shall include
its successors and assigns) hereby leases to W. Michael Nicholson and Joan Nicholson,
husband and wife, of HC-01, Box 445 - Eagle, Wallace, ID 83873 (''TENANT11, which shall
include their respective executors, administrators and assigns, subject to Section 10) and
TENANT hereby leases the Property described as follows:

A certain parcel of land located in Shoshone County, Idaho, consisting of
approximately one-half (1/2) acre, as presently occupied by TENANT for a
residential cabin site, located on the north side of the county road on the A.J.
Prichard (M.S. 567) Patented Mining Claim. This is a lease of the surface of the
land only; and only for the uses permitted by Section 5.
LANDLORD retains complete ownership of all trees on the Property and all
minerals thereon or therein. LANDLORD disclaims ownership of any building or trai)er
located on the Property and TENANT agrees that LANDLORD shall have no responsibility
or liability of any kind in connection therewith.

2.
LEASE TERM. The Term of this Lease shall be for one year, commencing
on July l, 1995, and ending on June 30, 1996.
3.
RENT. TENANT shall pay to LANDLORD, for the Term, rent at the rate
of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per year, payable in advance. Rent shall be paid
to LANDLORD at its office specified in Section 1.

4.

UTILITIES. TENANT shall pay for all of TENANT's utilities, water and
sewer use charges, heat and other operating expenses.

5.
USE OF LEASED PROPERTY. TENANT shall use the Property only forthe
purpose of a personal residential cabin location. TENANT expressly agrees that the
Property is not intended to be used as a storage yard for wrecked or obsolete vehicles or
equipment, or for any other vehicles, equipment or material belonging to others.
6.
COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS. TENANT agrees that no trade or occupation
shall be conducted on the Property or any use made thereof which will be unlawful,
improper, noisy or offensive, or contrary to any applicable law or any applicable county or
municipal by-law, regulation or ordinance.

7.

FIRE INSURANCE. TENANT shall not permit any use of the Property which

will make voidable any insurance on the Property or on the contents thereof or which shall
be contrary to any law or regulation from time to time established by the local Fire
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Insurance Rating Association or any similar body. TENANT shall on demand reimburse
LANDLORD for all extra insurance premiums caused by TENANT's use of the Property:
TENANT shall use TENANT's best efforts to avoid fire or other damage to the
leased Property or to other property of LANDLORD.
8.
MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY. TENANT agrees to maintain the Property
in the same condition as it is in at the commencement of the Term or such better condition
as it may be put in during the Term of this Lease, reasonable wear and tear, damage by-fire
and other casualty only excepted, acknowledging that the Property is now in good order.
TENANT shall not permit the Property to be overloaded, damaged, stripped or defaced, nor
suffer any waste. TENANT shall not cut or remove any trees from the Property and shall
not remove any minerals, rock or earth from the Property. TENANT shall obtain the prior
written consent of LANDLORD before erecting any sign on the Property.
9.
ALTERATIONS OR ADDITIONS. TENANT shall not make improvements
on, or alterations or additions to, the Property unless LANDLORD consents thereto in
advance in writing, which consent may be withheld in LANDLORD's sole discretion. All
such allowed improvements, alterations or additions shall be at TENANT's expense.
TENANT shaU not permit any mechanics' liens, or similar liens, to remain upon the
Property for labor and/or material furnished to TENANT or claimed to have been furnished
to TENANT in connection with work of any character performed: or claimed to have been
performed at the direction of TENANT and sha11 cause any such lien to be released of
record forthwith without cost to LANDLORD. Any improvements, alterations or
improvements made by TENANT sha1l become the property of LANDLORD unless
removed by TENANT at the termination of occupancy as provided herein.
10.
ASSIGNMENT OR SUBLEASING. TENANT shall not assign, sublet,
sublicense, or otheIWise underlet or share the whole or any part of the Property or this
Lease (regardless of what any such occupancy arrangement shall be designated and whether
or not the occupant gives consideration to TENANT therefor) without LANDLORD's prior
written consent, and no assignee, lessee or purchaser ofTENANT's building(s) and/or trailer
on the Property shall have or receive any rights hereunder without LANDLORD's prior
written consent. Notwithstanding any such consent, TENANT sha11 remain liable to
LANDLORD for the payment of a11 rent and for the full performance of the covenants and
conditions of this Lease. TENANT shall not, without LANDLORD's prior written consent,
permit any property of others to be placed upon or within the Property. TENANT shall
have no right to grant any third party a right-of-way over any pait of the Property and shaU
not suffer or permit any use of the Property by any third party.
11.
SUBORDINATION. This Lease shall be subject and subordinate to any and
all mortgages, deeds of trust, ground leases and other instruments in the nature of a
mortgage, now or at any time hereafter constituting a lien or liens on the Property.
TENANT shall, when requested, promptly execute and deliver such written instruments as
-2-
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shall be necessa.ry to confirm the subordination of this Lease to said mortgages, deeds of
trust, grouncl leases and other instruments. Further, this Lease is subject to all easements
and to all timber management and mineral leases which now or hereafter affect the
Property, and to any purchase and sale agreements which may affect the Property.
12.
LANDLORD's ACCESS. LANDLORD and its employees and agents may,
at reasonable times, enter to view the Property and may inspect the Property, and may show
the Property to others, and at any time may affix to any suitable part of the Property a
notice for letting or selling the Property and keep the same so af:fitxed without hindrance or
molestation. This Lease is subject to the right of LANDLORD, and its employees and
agents, to enter upon the Property for all lawful purposes, and to have access to and egress
from other land of LANDLORD by passing over and through the Property.
13.
INDEMNIFICATION. TENANT hereby agrees to indemnify and hold
LANDLORD harmless from aJl loss and damage occurring on or about the Property during
the Lease Term, as well as from any claim or damage resulting from neglect or by any
nuisance made or suffered on the Property.
14.
TENANT's LIABILITY INSURANCE. TENANT shall maintain with respect
to the Property comprehensive public liability insurance in the amount of at least
$100,000.00 and property damage insurance in limits of at least $25,000.00 with responsible
companies qualified to do business in Idaho and in good standing therein insuring
LANDLORD (as a named insured party, as its interest may appear), as well as TENANT
against injury to persons or damage to property. TENANT shall deposit with LANDLORD
certificates for such insurance at or prior to the commencement of the Term, and thereafter
within thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of any such policies. All such insurance
certificates shall provide that such policies shall not be cancelled without at least ten (10)
days prior written notice to each insured named therein.
15.
FIRE, CASUALTY OR EMINENT DOMAIN. Should a substantial portion
of the Property be substantia11y damaged by fire or other casualty, or be taken by eminent
domain, LANDLORD may elect to terminate this Lease. When such fire, casualty or taking
renders the Property substantia11y unsuitable for its intended use, a just and proportionate
abatement of rent shall be made, and TENANT may elect to tetillinate this Lease if:
(a)

LANDLORD fails to give wiitten notice within thirty (30) days of intention
to restore the Property, or

(b)

LANDLORD fails to restore the Property to a condition substantially suitable
for its intended use within ninety (90) days after said fire, casualty or taking.

LANDLORD reserves, and TENANT grants to LANDLORD, aH rights which
TENANT may have for damages or inju1y to the property for any taking by eminent
domain, except for damage to TENANT's fixtures, property or equipment.
-3-
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16.

DEFAULT OR BANKRUPTCY. In the event that:

(a)

TENANT shall default in the payment of any installment of rent or any other
sum herein specified and such default shaH continue for ten (10) days after
written notice thereof; or

(b)

TENANT shaI1 default in the obseivance or performance of any other of
TENANT's covenants, agreements or obligations hereunder and such default
shall not be corrected within thirty (30) days after written notice thereof; or

(c)

TENANT shall be declared bankrupt or insolvent according to law, or, if any
assignment shall be made ofTENANT's property for the benefit ofcreditors,
then

LANDLORD shall have the right thereafter, while such default continues, to re-enter
and take complete possession of the Property, to declare the Term of this Lease ended, and
remove TENANT's effects, without prejudice to any remedies which might be otherwise
used for arrears of rent or any other default. TENANT shall indemnify LANDLORD
against all loss of rent and other payments which LANDLORD may incur by reason of such
termination dming the remainder of the Term. If TENANT shall default, after reasonable
notice thereof, in the observance or performance of any conditions or covenants on
TENANT's part to be obseived or performed under or by virtue of any of the provisions of
this Lease, LANDLORD, without being under any obligation to do so and without thereby
waiving such default, may remedy such default for the account and at the expense of
TENANT. If LANDLORD makes any expenditures or incurs any obligations for the
payment of money in connection therewith, including but not limited to, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs of litigation in instituting, prosecuting or defending any action or
proceeding, such sums paid or obligations incurred, with interest at the rate of 18% per
annum and costs, shall be paid to LANDLORD by TENANT as additional rent.

17.

NOTICE.
Any notice from LANDLORD to TENANT relating to the
Property or to the occupancy thereof, shall be deemed duly served, if left at the Property
addressed to TENANT, or, if mailed to the Property or to TENANT's address specified in
Section 1, by certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to
TENANT. Any notice from TENANT to LANDLORD relating to the Property or to the
occupancy thereof, shall be deemed duly se1ved, if mailed to LANDLORD by certified mail,
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to LANDLORD at such address as the
LANDLORD may from time to time advise in writing. All rent and notices shaU be paid
and sent to LANDLORD at 20 William Street, Suite 120, Wellesley, MA 02181-4102, c/o
W. E. Gardner PC, unless otherwise specified by LANDLORD.

18.

SURRENDER OF THE PROPERTY. TENANT shall at the expiration or
other termination of this Lease remove all of TENANT's goods and effects from the
Property (including, without limitation, TENANT's cabin, trailer, improvements, equipment
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and personal property of all kinds). Subject thereto, TENANT shall deliver the Property
to LANDLORD in the same condition as it was in at the commencement of the Term, or
such better condition as it was put in during the Term, reasonable wear and tear and
damage by fire or other casualty only excepted. In the event of TENANTs failure to
remove any of TENANT's property from the Property, LANDLORD is hereby authorized,
without liability to TENANT for loss or damage thereto, and at the sole risk of TENANT,
to remove and store any of such property at TENANT's expense, or to retain such property
under LANDLORD's control, or to sell at public or private sale, without notice, any or all
of the property not so removed and to apply the net proceeds of such sale to the payment
of any sum due hereunder, or to destroy such property. Further, to secure TENANT's
obligations under this Section 18, LANDLORD is hereby granted a security interest in said
property (including proceeds and after acquired property) under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as adopted in the Idaho Code.

19.

NO WAIVER No consent or waiver, express or implied, by LANDLORD or

TENANT to or of any breach of any covenant, condition or duty of the other shall be
construed as a consent or waiver to or of any other breach of the same or of any other
covenant, condition or duty. No payment by TENANT or receipt by LANDLORD of a
lesser amount than the rent and other charges herein rese1ved shall be deemed to be other
than on account towards the stipulated amount. If any action by TENANT or LANDLORD
shall require the consent or approval of the other, such consent to or approval of such
action on any one occasion shall not be deemed a consent to or approval of such action on
any subsequent occasion or a consent to or approval of any oilier action on the same or any
subsequent occasion. All rights and remedies which LANDLORD or TENANT may have
under this Lease or by operation of law, either at law or in equity, upon any breach, shall
be distinct, separate and cumulative, and shall not be deemed inconsistent with each other;
and no one of them, whether or not exercised by LANDLORD or TENANT, shaH be
deemed to be in exclusion of any other; and any two or more or all of such rights and
remedies may be exercised by LANDLORD or TENANT a.t the same time.
20.
QUIET ENJOYMENT. LANDLORD covenants arid agrees that TENANT,
upon paying the agreed rent set forth herein and obse1ving and keeping all the covenants,
agreements and conditions of this Lease on TENANT's part to be kept, shall IawfuUy and
quietly hold, occupy and enjoy the Property during the Term, in accordance with the
provisions of this Lease.
21.
FINAL AGREEMENT. The parties acknow]edge that in the course of
negotiating this Lease they have gradually reached pre1imina1y agreement on the several
terms set forth in this instrument. TI1e parties acknowledge and agree that at all times they
have intended that none of such prelimina1y agreements (either singly or in combination)
shall be binding on either party untiJ and unless a single, formal comprehensive document
containing aJl the agreements of the parties, in final fonn, has been executed by
LANDLORD and by TENANT. This Lease is that document.
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22.
SEVERABILITY; DAMAGES. If any provision of this Lease shaJl be
detenrlined to be void or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining
provisions shall not thereby be affected. In no event shaJl LANDLORD be liable to
TENANT for any indirect or consequential damages from any cause whatsoever, unless
caused by willful action of LANDLORD in breach of this Lease.

BROKERAGE. TENANT hereby represents and warrants to LANDLORD
23.
that, except to the extent, if any, hereinafter set forth, it has dealt with no broker or finder
in connection with this Lease and there are no brokerage commissions or other finders' fees
in connection herewith. TENANT hereby agrees to hold LANDLORD harmless from, and
indemnified against, all Joss or damage (including, without limitation, the cost of legal
defense) arising from any claim by any broker or finder c1aiming to have dealt with
TENANT.
24.
INTEREST ON OVERDUE PAYMENTS. All payments agreed to be made
by TENANT hereunder, including without limitation rent, other sums or charges and
LANDLORD's expenses and attorneys' fees, if not paid by TENANT when due, subject to
any period for payment after notice, shall bear interest for each month and any portion
thereof from the original due date (without regard to any notice or grace periodr at the rate
of 18% per annum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF LANDLORD and TENANT have hereunto set their
day of August 1995.
hands and seals on or as of this

'2!!£

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
COMPANY-LANDLORD

B6L/1

Wilfred E. . . .=·Ghli""-a-1--dn_e_r_,-P-re-s-id_e_n_t_ __

TENANT's telephone number
is 208/682-2905

LANDLORD's telephone number is
617/237-2112

-6-
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EXHIBIT C
181

GAJL KINGSLEY WOLFAHRT
Admitted in Maine and Massachusetts
Offices in Burlington, MA and Kennebunk ME
•
gldngsleyralLOKLLC'.com
Telephone in Maine: 207-985-1815
Massachusetts: 508-479-1065
Fax: 207-985-7817

June 17, 2013
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
\Vallace, Idaho 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson:
I am the attorney for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company and Secretary of the corporation.
You have not paid the $2,250 due in 2012 for your land lease for whatever reason. Please send
your payment immediately to my attention.
At this time your payment for $2,250 for 2013 is also due. However, the Company's Idaho land
is currently under contract for sale. We have only a brief period to arrange for a sale of your
homesite to you. The buyer will not permit tenants on any of their land. Our real estate broker,
Kevin Boling, will be contacting you shortly to discuss your options.

If you plan to continue to lease for the period that the Company's agreement allows you do so, it
will be on a month-to-month basis. Please send $2,250 now to renew your lease and any unused
portion of the rent will be returned to you when you vacate the property.

Attorney Fees. As provided in ali prior ieases, if action is brought to enforce the terms or
provisions of this lease, or to enforce forfeiture for default or to collect damages for breach, the
prevailing party is such action shall be entitled to recover from the losing party reasonable
attorney fees and costs as authorized by law.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to me together
with your check for $4,500 that will bring last year's lease current and will constitute a renewal
of your lease on a month-to-month basis.
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Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road • Suite 17 • Kennebunk, ME 0+04 3
ME 207-985-1815 • MA 508-479-1065 • FAX 207-985-7817

EXHIBIT

C

·Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
JW1e 17, 2013

Page 2

Please send a signed copy of this letter and your check payable to Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company to:
Attorney Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt
Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road, Suite 17
Kennebunk, Maine 04043
Sincerely,

GKW/ms
ACCEPTED:~~~~~~~~
Date

W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
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Joan K. Nicholson
W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Phone: 208-682-4094

Email: mikenioan@wildblue.net
June 25, 2013

Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt
Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road, Suite 17

Kennebunk, Main 04043

RE: Lease at Eagle City, Idaho Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
Dear Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt:
Thank you for your letter dated June

17th.

It is nice to know there is someone we can

communicate with and that there is someone helping to look after the best interests of the
Company and the Gardner family. In the 19 years that we have been associated with this land
and the company and the Gardner's, it seems like we had created a great deal of
communication and visits over a period of time. Unfortunately things started to change
approximately 4 years ago and for some reason that communication came to a stop. We have
now learned of the severity of Dr. Gardner's illness and will ask you to pass on our best wishes
for a healthy recovery.
We have enclosed a check in the amount $2,250.00. This is for the period of July 2012 to July

2013
We plan to continue our lease as we have for the past 19 years and we fully accept and
acknowledge the conditions of the continuing lease agreements.
We request to pay the July 2013 to July 2014 lease period in 9 equal payment of $250.00
starting in August of 2013. We have been able to do this in the past and at this time because of
increased medical expenses we find ourselves requesting it again.
Thank you for your assistance and we look forward to renewed communication. We will
attempt to reach you by phone.

Joan K. Nicholson
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W. Michael Nicholson

GAIL KINGSLEY WOLFAHRT
Admitted in Maine and Massachusetts

Offices in Burlington, MA and Kennebunk, ME
'

gkingsley@LOKLLCcom
Telephone in Maine:
Massachusetts:
Fax:

207-985-1815
508-479-! 065
207-985-7817

July 9, 2013

Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873

RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson:

Thank you for your $2,250 check in payment of your past due 2012 land lease.
We are not willing to accept monthly payments on your current lease. Please send a check in the
amount of $2,250 to my attention.
Attorney Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt
Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road, Suite 17
Kennebunk, Maine 04043
Any used portion of your payment will be reimbursed to you on a prorata basis when the sale of
our land is completed.
Sincerely,
COfUR D'ALENE PLACER ~INING C<?~.fANY
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--- Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt, Secrefry
GKW/ms
Cc: Elizabeth B. Gardner

185
Libby O'Brien Kingsle:v & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road • Suite 17 • Kennebunk, !v\E 0404 3
ME207-985-l815 • MA 508-479-1065 • FAX207-985-7817

Joan K. Nicholson
W. Michael Nicholson

2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Phone: 208-682-4094
Email: mikenjoan@wildblue.net
August 7, 2013

Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt
Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC
62 Portland Road, Suite 17
Kennebunk, Main 04043

RE: Lease at Eagle City, Idaho Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company

Dear Gail Kingsley Wolfahrt:

We plan to continue our lease as we have for the past 19 years and we fully accept and
acknowledge the conditions of the continuing lease agreements.
We have enclosed a check in the amount $2,250.00. This is for the period of July 2013 to July

2014
Thank you for your assistance and we look forward to renewed communication.

Sincerely,

Cc:
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June 26, 2009
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson,,
Your Land Lease with this Company expires by its terms on
June 30, 2009. However, if you wish to renew for another twelve
(12) months, our Company is willing to do so, at an annual rent
of $2,000. As there has not be a raise in rent during the past
nine years, I am reminding you that this year's annual rent will
be $2250.00 for 2000-10. You should mail a check to me in the
amount of $2250 by July 30, 2010.
Attorneys Fees. If action is brought to enforce the terms
or provisions of this lease, or to enforce forfeiture for
default or to collect damages for breach, the prevailing party
in such action shall be entitled to recover from the losing
party reasonable attorney fees and costs as authorized by law.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the
extra copy of this letter to me, along with your check for
$2250, that will constitute a renewal for the year ahead on the
same terms as your present Lease.
I will be on the property some time this summer and hope to
meet with both of you.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP.
24 LANARK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS . MA

02481

Page 2
The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur
d'Alene Placer Mining Company hereby agrees to an extension of
the Lease Term for the 12 months ending June 30, 2008, at annua:
rent in the amount of $2250, a check in payment of $2250 is
enclosed and will be sent by July 30, 2008 unless other
arrangements are made by that time.
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP.
24 LANARK ROAD

WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02481

July, 16, 2008
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road

Wallace, Idaho 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson,,

-z.0t/J
Your Land Lease with this Company expires by its terms on June 30, 2006.
However, if you wish to renew for another twelve (12) months, our Company is
willing to do so, at an annual rent of $2,000. As there has not be a raise in rent
during the past nine years, I am reminding you that this year's annual rent will be
$2250.00 for 2008-09. You should mail a check to me in the amount of$2250 by
July 30, 2008

Attorneys Fees. If action is brought to enforce the terms or provisions of this
lease, or to enforce forfeiture for default or to collect damages for breach, the
prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to recover from the losing party
reason~ble attorney fees and costs as authorized by law.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this
letter to me, along with your check for $2250, that will constitute a renewal for the
year ahead on the same terms as your present Lease.
I will be on the property some time this summer and hope to meet with both
ofyou.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

Zs~~ v~J\ ~J~
Elizabeth B. Gardner, President
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP,
24 LANARK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MA

02481

Page2
The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur d'Alene Placer
Mining Company hereby agrees to an extension of the Lease Term for the 12
months ending June 30, 2oo{!at annual rent in the amount of $2250, a check in
payment of $2250 is enclosed and will be sent by July 30, 2008 unless other
arrangements are made by that time.
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June 6, 2007
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873

RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson,,
Your Land Lease with this Company expires by its terms on June 30, 2006. However,
if you wish to renew for another twelve (12) months, our Company is willing to do so, at an
annual rent of $2,000. As there has not be a raise in rent during the past nine years, I am
informing you, in advance, that next year's annual rent will be $2250.00 for 2008-09.

Attorneys Fees. If action is brought to enforce the terms or provisions of this lease, or
to enforce forfeiture for default or to collect damages for breach, the prevailing party in such
action shall be entitled to recover from the losing party reasonable attorney fees and costs as
authorized by law.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to me,
along with your check for $2000, that will constitute a renewal for the year ahead on the same
terms as your present Lease.
I will be on the property some time this summer and hope to meet with both of you.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

1.\.)a J

rs

Page2
The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company hereby agrees to an extension of the Lease Term for the 12 months ending June 30,
2008, at annual rent in the amount of $2000, a check in payment of $2000 is enclosed and will
be sent py July 15, 2007 unless other arrangements are made by that time.

2007
W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP.
76 GARDEN ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02481

June 20, 2006

Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson,,
Your Land Lease with this Company expires by its terms on June 30, 2006. However,
if you wish to renew for another twelve (12) months, our Company is willing to do so, at an
annual rent of $2,000.

Attorneys Fees. If action is brought to enforce the terms or provisions of this lease, or
to enforce forfeiture for default or to collect damages for breach, the prevailing party in such
action shall be entitled to recover from the losing party reasonable attorney fees and costs as
authorized by law.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to me,
along with your check for $2000, that will constitute a renewal for the year ahead on the same
terms as your present Lease.
I will be on the property some time this summer and hope to meet with both of you.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

1 0 r:

·<J•.)

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP,
76 GARDE:N ROAD
WE:LLESLEY HILLS, MA

02481

Page2
The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company hereby agrees to an extension of the Lease Term for the 12 months ending June 30,
2007, at annual rent in the amount of $2000, a check in payment of $2000 is enclosed and will
be sent by July 15, 2006 unless other arrangements are made by that time.

2006
W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
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Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
7 6 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02481
781-235-7707; FAX 237-2112
June 29,2005
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, ID 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan,
Your Land Lease with this Company expired by its terms on June 30, 2005. However, if you
wish to renew for another twelve (12) months, our Company is willing to do so, at an annual rent
of$2,000.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for $2000, that will constitute a renewal for the year ahead on the same terms
as your present Lease.

I will be on the property Thursday, July 14th and hope to meet with you and to get a signed
copy of the lease and your check.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
hereby agrees to an extension of the Lease Term for the 12 months ending June 30, 2006, at annual
rent in the amount of$2,000, a check in payment of$2,000 is enclosed and will be sent by July 30,
2005 unless other arrangements are made by that time.
2005
W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
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W. Michael Nicholson
Joan K. Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wal~e, Idaho 83873
Phone: (208) 682-2905

Fax: (208) 682-9520
Email: Northtravel@aol.com

February 23, 2002
Elizabeth B. Gardner, President
Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
76 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts 02481

RE: Lease at Eagle City, Idaho

Dear Mrs. Gardner,
I am pleased to send you the remaining balance of $1,250.00 for the lease payment as per
our agreement of August 14, 200 I. As we agreed, this includes $1,000.00 for the completion of
the lease payment, and $250.00 late penalty.
We appreciate your patience, and will make every effort to assure you that this will never
happen again.
We hope this finds you well, and wish you the very best.

Best Regards,

Joan K. Nicholson

W. Michael Nicholson
Joan K. Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Phone: (208) 682-2905 Fax: (208) 682-9520
E-mail: Northtravel@aol.com

August 17, 2001
Elizabeth B. G.ardner, P.resident
Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
76 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02481

RE: Lease at Eagle City. ID

Dear Mrs. Gardner,

As per our phone conversation on August 14, 2001, the following is a detailled payment schedule for the
payment of the $2,000.00 lease for the 12 months ending June 30, 2002.
Payment of$1,000.00 on or before November 1, 2001, with a late payment penalty of$250.00;
total due - $1,250.00.
Payment of$1,000.00 on or before March 1, 2002, with a late payment penalty of$250.00;
total due - $1,250.00.

If payment is made in full on or before November 1, 2001, then a late penalty of$250.00 shall
apply; total due - $2,250.00.
This payment plan shall apply only to the lease from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2002. Failure to meet
these deadlines could result in eviction.

Sincerely,
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C?eur D'.Alene Placer Mining Company
76 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02481
781-235-7707; FAX 237-2112
July 21, 2001
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, ID 83873
RE:

Lease at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan
Your Land Lease with this Company expired by its tenns on June 30, 2001. However, if you
wish to renew for another twelve ( 12) months, our Company is willing to do so, at an annual rent
of$2,000.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for $2000, that will constitute a renewal for the year ahead on the same terms
as your present Lease. Although this lease has been sent late by its terms, I have assumed that you
wish to continue your lease not having heard from you.
Sincerely yours,
COEUR d'ALENE PLACER MINING COMP ANY

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

The undersigned Tenant under a Land Lease with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
hereby agrees to an extension of the Lease Term for the 12 months ending June 30, 2002, at annual
rent in the amount of $2,000, a check in payment of $2,000 is enclosed and will be sent by
Augustl5, 2001 unless other arrangements are made by that time.
2001
W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
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Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining Company
76 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02481
781-235-7707; FAX 237-2112

July 10, 1999
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC~Ol, Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873

RE:

Lease of Land at EaiJe, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan:
The current tenn of your Land Lease with this Company expired by its terms on June 30,
1999. However, if you wish to renew for another twelve months, we are willing to extend at an
annual rent of$2,000.00, which reflects a $100 increase in rent over last year.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for the next year's rent, by July 30, 1999, that will constitute a renewal for the
next year (through June 30, 2000) on the same terms (aside from the rent) as your present Lease.

Sincerely,
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER :MINING COMPANY

~c,~-.!z~

~~~

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

w:~

The undersigned Tenants under a Land Lease with Coeur D ·Alene Placer mining Company
hereby agree to an extension of the Lease Term for the twelve months ending June 30, 2000, at
annual rent, paid in advance, of $2,000, a checlc in p:yment of

Date: July _, 1999

EBG/lph
Enclosure

CDA-99
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Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining Company
76 Garden Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02481
781-235-7707; FAX 237-2112

July 10, 1999
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC-01, Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873

· RE:

Lease ofLand at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan:
The current term of your Land Lease with this Company expired by its terms on June 30,
1999. However, if you wish to renew for another twelve months, we are willing to extend at an
annual rent of$2,000.00, which reflects a $100 increase in rent over last year.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for the next year's rent, by July 30, 1999, that will constitute a renewal for the
next year (through June 30, 2000) on the same terms (aside from the rent) as your present Lease.
Sincerely,

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MIN1NG CO.MPANY
~C-~aa'z~

~~k_

Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

The undersigned Tenants under a Land Lease with Coeur D'Alene Placer mining Company
hereby agree to an extension of the Lease Term for the twelve months ending June 30, 2000, at
annual rent, paid in advance, of $2,000, a check in payment of which is attached.

Date: July __, 1999

W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
EBG/lph
Enclosure
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY
GARDNER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
20 WILLIAM STREET, SUITE 120
a,-WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02181 USA
NOTENEWAREACODE:78fQ"
TEL ..6.l-=r-237-2112 FAX 617-237-4545
NOTENEWZJPCODE:Ol 4

(1781 j
August 31, 1998
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC-0 I , Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873
RE:

Lease of Land at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan:
I apologize for the delay in getting this Lease Renewal to you. As you know, the current term
of your Land Lease with this Company expired by its terms on June 30, 1998. If you wish to renew for
another twelve months, we are willing to extend at an annual rent of$ I ,900, which contains no increase
in rent.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us, along
with your check for the next year's rent, that will constitute a renewal for the next year (through June 30,
1999) on the same terms as your present Lease. Please note that the Company's new mailing address,
effective immediately, is Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining Company, 76 Garden Road, Wellesley Hills, MA
02481. The telephone number will remain the same (781-237-21 12).
Sincerely,
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY

~-1~
Elizabeth B. Gardner, President

(

-°f'-

The undersigned Tenants under a Land Lease with Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining Company
hereby agree to an extension of the Lease Term for the twelve months ending June 30, 1999, at annual
rent, paid in advance, of$ I, 900, a check in payment of which is attached.

W. Michael Nicholson
EBG;lph
Enclosure
CDA-98

Joan Nicholson
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COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING COMPANY
GARDNER'PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
20 WILLIAM STREET, SUITE 120
WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02181 USA
TEL 617-237-2112 FAX 617-237-4545

June 17, 1997
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC-01, Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873
RE:

Lease of Land at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mik:e and Joan:
The current term of your Land Lease with this Company will expire by its terms on June 30,
1997. However, if you wish to renew for another twelve months, we are willing to extend at an
annual rent of $1,900, which contains a modest increase.
If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for the next year's rent, by June 30, 1997, that will constitute a renewal for
the next year (through June 30, 1998) on the same terms (aside from the rent) as your present Lease.
Sincerely,
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING COMP ANY

ell£(~
Wilfred E. Gardner, President

The undersigned Tenants under a Land Lease with Coeur D'Alene Placer mining Company
hereby agree to an extension of the Lease Term for the twelve months ending June 30, 1998, at
annual rent, paid in advance, of $1,900, a check in payment of which is attached.

W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
WEG/lph
Enclosure

CDA-97

206

COEUR D'ALENE PI.ACER MINING COMPANY
GARDNER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
20 WILLIAM STREET, SUITE 120
WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02181 USA
TEL 617-237-2112 FAX 617-23 7-4545

May 16, 1996
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC-01, Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873
RE:

Lease of Land at Eagle, Idaho

Dear Mike and Joan:
The current term of your Land Lease with this Company will expire by its terms on June 30,
1996. However, if you wish to renew for another twelve months, we are willing to extend at an
annual rent of $1,800, which contains a modest increase.

If you will sign at the space provided below and return the extra copy of this letter to us,
along with your check for the next year's rent, by June 30, l 996, that will constitute a renewal for
the next year (through June 30, 1997) on the same terms (aside from the rent) as your present Lease.
Sincerely,

Wilfred E. Gardner, President

The undersigned Tenants under a Land Lease with Coeur D'Alene Placer mining Company
hereby agree to an extension of the Lease Term for the twelve months ending June 30, 1997, at
annual rent, paid in advance, of $1,800, a check in payment of which is attached.

W. Michael Nicholson

Joan Nicholson
WEG/lph
Enclosure
CDA-96
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COEUR D'ALENE PIACER MINING COMPANY
GARDNER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
20 WILLIAM STREET, SUITE 120
WELLESLEY HILLS, MA 02181 USA
TEL 617-237-2112 FAX 617-237-4545

August 31, 1995
Mr. and Mrs. W. Michael Nicholson
HC-01, Box 445 - Eagle
Wallace, ID 83873
Dear Mike and Joan:
Here is a fully executed Lease with this Company. I have sent the Cabin Sale
Agreement to Francis Gitter, as advised by Mike, and I hope to have that executed and
returned to me shortly.
We look f01ward to a long and happy relationship. Please keep in touch if there is
something going on in the area with which you are uncomfortable or which you feel is not
in the best interests of this Company.
We are working on establishing the Golden Valley Foundation to take the lead on
preserving the Old Murray Courthouse. See the enclosed. In addition to financial support,
we will need local volunteers, to watch over the building, help when it is open, etc.
Best regards.
Sincerely,

1/4

Wilfred E. Gardner
WEG/lph
Enclosures
CDA-95
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184

ZD/5 FEB -9 PH 3: 12

Attorneys for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
MLLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,

Case No. CV-2014-375
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

tc:. -S-l,\c\~ ~ G-: b1et"'
~~oft

Defendants.
Defendants Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company, ("CDA Placer") and IFG
Timber, LLC ("IFG") submit their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment.
INTRODUCTION

William and Joan Nicholson (the "Nicholsons") purchased buildings ("Buildings") on
a parcel of property from a non-party. Subsequently, the Nicholsons entered into a Land Lease
agreement ("Land Lease") with CDA Placer to lease a parcel of property ("Property") where
the Buildings were located.

The Nicholsons renewed the Land Lease annually from

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT-I
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approximately 1995 until 2014. In 2012, an agent of CDA Placer informed the Nicholsons
that CDA Placer intended to sell the Property and invited the Nicholsons to make an offer to
purchase the Property. The Nicholsons were also informed that if they did not purchase the
Property, the potential purchaser (IFG) would not allow tenants and the Nicholsons would
have to vacate the Property. The Nicholsons offered to purchase the Property for the annual
rents already paid under the Land Lease. The Nicholsons' offer was denied. In January 2014,
CDA Placer gave the Nicholsons a written notice of termination of the Land Lease and sold
the Property to IFG. The Nicholsons filed the present lawsuit and continue to unlawfully reside
on the Property without paying rent.
The Nicholsons assert claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, specific
performance and unjust enrichment against CDA Placer. The Nicholsons assert a claim for
unjust enrichment against IFG. The Nicholsons' claims are based upon the theory that they
had a first right of refusal ("Option") to purchase the Property from CDA Placer if it decided
to sell the Property, and that CDA Placer had to purchase the Buildings if it terminated the
Land Lease. There is no evidence on this record to support the Nicholsons' claims under either
theory.
There is no evidence of a written Option or agreement to purchase the Buildings on this
record and thus, the Nicholsons' claims for breach of contract is barred by the statute of frauds.
The breach of contract claim also fails for want of consideration and lack of definiteness. The
Nicholsons' claims for promissory estoppel and specific performance fail for the same reasons
as the breach of contract claim, because without an enforceable contract, promissory estoppel
and specific performance cannot be imposed. The Nicholsons' claim for unjust enrichment is

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
ruDGMENT - 2
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based upon the claim that they maintained and improved the Property. The Nicholsons had a
·preexisting duty to maintain the Property, they did not have the right to make improvements,
and they expressly agreed any improvements, authorized or not, became the property of CDA
Placer and IFG. Thus, the Nicholsons unjust enrichment claim fails because they have not
conferred any benefit on CDA Placer or IFG and no inequitable result will occur.
No genuine issue of material fact exists. CDA Placer and IFG are entitled to summary
judgment.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Around August, 1995, the Nicholsons purchased various Buildings from Francis Gitter.

Complaint, ,I 2.1. CDA Placer owned the Property where the Buildings were located. CDA
Placer Answer, Ex. A.
2. On August 28, 1995, the Nicholsons entered into the Land Lease with CDA Placer to lease
the Property for a period commencing July 1, 1995 through June 30. 1996. A.ff. T De Smet, Ex.
B. The Nicholsons have renewed the Land Lease annually and continued to do so until June 30,
2014. A.ff. T De Smet, Ex. C.; Answer CDA Placer, ,I 8. The Nicholsons were to pay CDA Placer
$2,250 per year for rent, pursuant to the Land Lease. Answer/Counterclaim IFG, Ex. B, C and D.

3. The Land Lease provides:
"LANDLORD disclaims ownership of any buildings or trailer located on the Property
and TENANT agrees that LANDLORD shall have no responsibility or liability of any
kind in connection therewith.

ALTERATIONS OR ADDITIONS. TENANT shall not make improvements on,
or alterations or additions to, the Property unless LANDLORD consents thereto in
advance in writing, which consent may be withheld in LANDLORD's sole
discretion .... Any improvements, alterations or improvements made by TENANT
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 3
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shall become the property of LANDLORD unless removed by TENANT at the
termination of occupancy as provided herein.".
A.ff T. De Smet. Ex. B.

4. In April of 2012, Kevin Boling, of the Boling Company, met with the Nicholsons on the
Property and notified them that CDA Placer was offering the Property for sale.
Answer/Counterclaim IFG, ,i 4. Kevin Boling offered the Nicholsons the opportunity to purchase

the Property. Id. The Nicholsons responded to the offer by indicating they would consider the
opportunity. Id.
5. On June 17, 2013, CDA Placer wrote the Nicholsons a letter informing them that CDA
Placer was under contract to sell the Property. Id., ,i 5, Ex. B.; A.ff T. De Smet, Ex. C. CDA Placer
again solicited the Nicholsons to purchase the Property and specifically informed them: "We have
only a brief period to arrange for a sale of your homesite to you. The buyer will not permit tenants
on any of their land. Our real estate broker, Kevin Boling, will be contacting you shortly to
discuss your options." Id.
6. On December 10, 2013, Kevin Boling wrote the Nicholsons reminding them of his
discussions with them about CDA Placer's intent to sell the Property and their opportunity to
purchase the Property. Id., ,i 9, Ex. F. Specifically, Kevin Boling reminded the Nicholsons that
the Property was under contract to be sold and informed them as follows:
"There remains a brief period of time for you to make an offer to purchase this
home site. Please let me know at your earliest convenience if that is an option for
you. If purchase is not an option for you then we need to discuss your plans for
vacating the property." Id.
7. On January 28, 2014, Coeur d'Alene Placer, through counsel, Michael K. Branstetter,
sent "NOTICE OF TERMINATION" of the Land Lease. Id.,

ii I I,

Ex. G. The "NOTICE OF

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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TERMINATION" provided notice to the Nicholsons that their tenancy under the Land Lease

..

was being terminated on June 30, 2014 and demanded that the Nicholsons vacate the Property
by midnight on June 30, 2014. Id.
8.

On March 6, 2014, the Nicholsons' lawyer wrote to Michael K. Branstetter claiming

the Nicholsons had a first right of refusal to purchase the Property and threatening to sue CDA
Placer and IFG if the matter was not resolved and offering to purchase the Property (plus a
contiguous parcel of property of equal size) for the annual rent already paid. Id., ,i 12, Ex. H.
9. On March 18, 2014, CDA Placer, through counsel, Michael K. Branstetter wrote to the
Nicholsons' attorney, requested a copy of the right of first refusal claimed by the Nicholsons,
notified the Nicholsons of their obligation to vacate the Property at the expiration of the lease
on June 30, 2014, rejected the Nicholsons' offer to purchase for the rent already paid, and
notified the Nicholsons ofldaho Code § 6-324 concerning attorney fees. Id., ,i 13, Ex. I.
10. The Nichol sons did not produce a first right of refusal and no evidence of a written first
right of refusal exists on this record.
11. The Nicholsons offered to purchase the Property. Id., ,i JO; A.ff T. De Smet, Ex. A (RFA
No. 7.). The Nicholsons offer was denied.

12. Around March of 2014, IFG purchased the Property from CDA Placer. Id., Ex. K.
13. The Nicholsons own the Buildings on the Property. Complaint, ,i,i 2.1, 6.3.
14. The Nicholsons have leased the Property from 1995 to June 30, 2014, pursuant to the
terms of the Land Lease. 1 A.ff T. De Smet, Ex. B, C.. The terms of the Land Lease control the

1

"We [the Nicholsons] plan to continue our lease as we have for the past 19 years and we fully
accept and acknowledge the conditions of the continuing lease agreement." The Nicholsons'
letter to CDA Placer of June 25, 2013. See A.ff T De Smet, Ex. C.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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landlord-tenant relationship between the Nicholsons and CDA Placer. Id.
15. The Nicholsons' lease expired on June 30, 2014 and has not been renewed.
Answer/Counterclaim IFG, ,I 17.

16. The Nicholsons continue to remain in possession of the Property. Id,

iiii 17,

18.

17. The Nicholsons have not paid rent for the Property since their lease expired on June 30,
2014. Id.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

If a motion for summary judgment is supported by a particularized affidavit, the
opposing party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings,"
but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of fact. I.R.C.P. 56 (e); Verbillis v.
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct.App. 1984). Summary

judgments are to be decided on facts actually shown in the record. Id.; Lind v. Perkins, 107
Idaho 901, 903, 693 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App. 1984). A court will not hypothecate facts to
forestall a summary judgment. Eimco Div., Environtech v. United Pacific, 109 Idaho 762, 764,
710 P .2d 672, 674 (1985). Further, it is well settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a
slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark
Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).

The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. When there are no genuine
issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a trial court is justified
in denying a trial on the merits. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 340, 563 P.2d 395 (1977).
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.

..

.

The Nicholsons' Breach of Contract Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.

The statute of frauds requires a conveyance of interest in real property to be in writing
in order to be enforceable. Idaho Code § 9-503 provides:
"TRANSFERS OF REAL PROPERTY TO BE IN WRITING. No estate or
interest in real property, ... or in any manner relating thereto, can be created,
granted assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law,
or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing."
A first right of refusal or option to purchase real property is an interest in real property
that must be in writing to be enforceable. Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476, 197 P.3d 789 (Ct.
App. 2008); Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P.2d 925 (1968). The statute of frauds
applies to the Nicholsons' alleged Option.
There is no evidence on this record of a written Option between CDA Placer and the
Nicholsons. The Nicholsons' breach of contract claim based upon the alleged Option fails.
The alleged agreement to purchase the Buildings is also unenforceable based upon the
statute of frauds. The Uniform Commercial Code, Idaho Code§ 28-2-201 provides:
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS - STATUTE OF FRAUDS. (1) Except as
otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker ... "
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The Buildings are goods. IC § 28-2-105(1). 23 The Nicholsons allege the Buildings
have a value over $500.00. A.ff. T De Smet, Ex. A (Interrogatory No. 12). The alleged
agreement to purchase the Buildings is subject to the statute of frauds. There is no evidence
on this record of a written agreement to purchase the Buildings. The statute of frauds renders
the alleged agreement to purchase the Buildings unenforceable.
Even if the Option was somehow excepted from the statute of frauds, CDA Placer did
not breach any contract because CDA Placer offered to allow the Nicholsons to purchase the
Property-on at least three different occasions. 4
On December 10, 2013, Kevin Boling, on behalf of CDA Placer wrote the Nicholsons
the following:
"Anticipating the sale of the Coeur d' Alene Placer properties in early 2012,
Beth Gardner asked me to contact each of the leases (sic) of her property
informing them the property was listed for sale and to offer each of you the
opportunity to purchase your lease home site. I met with you .. .in April 2012
inviting you to make Beth Gardner an offer to purchase your leased home site
property. You'll recall we spent an hour together in the cab of my pick-up in
the rain discussing the opportunity ... You indicated at the time that you would
consider the opportunity .. .I left you my business card and told you to contact
me with your decision. I did not and have not heard from you since that April
2012 meeting.
2

"'Goods' means all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities and things in
action ... "
3 If the Buildings are not goods, they are real property and the statute of frauds, under Idaho
Code§ 9-503, would bar enforcement of the alleged agreement to purchase the Buildings.
4 In April of 2012, Kevin Boling, of the Boling Company, met with the Nicholsons on the Property
and notified them that CDA Placer was offering the Property for sale and provided the Nicholsons
the opportunity to purchase the Property. Answer CDA Placer, ,i 4. The Nicholsons responded to the
offer by indicating they would consider the opportunity. Id.
On June 17, 2013, CDA Placer wrote the Nicholsons a letter informing them that CDA Placer was
under contract to sell the Property. Id, ,i 5, Ex. B. CDA Placer again solicited the Nicholsons to
purchase the Property and specifically informed them: "We have only a brief period to arrange for a
sale of your homesite to you. The buyer will not permit tenants on any of their land. Our real estate
broker, Kevin Boling, will be contacting you shortly to discuss your options." Id.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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There remains a brief period of time for you to make an offer to purchase this
home site. Please let me know at your earliest convenience if that is an option
for you .... "
Answer/Counterclaim IFG,

,r 9, Ex. F.

The Nichol sons offered to purchase the Property for the annual rents already paid under
the Land Lease. Id., Ex. H, I; Aff. T De Smet, Ex. A (RFA 7). CDA Placer rejected the offer.
Id. The Nicholsons cannot now claim CDA Placer breached an alleged Option.
The Nicholsons breach of contract claim also fails for want of consideration and
definiteness. Whether consideration is given for an option contract is determined at the time
the option contract is entered. 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts§ 124. "To be enforceable at law, an
agreement must be supported by valid consideration." Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass 'n,
Inc., 152 Idaho 519,526,272 P.3d 491,498 (2011); Great Plaints Equip., Inc. v. NW Pipeline
Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769 979 P.2d 627, 642 (1999).

Consideration is essential to the

formation of a contract. There is no evidence on this record that any consideration was
exchanged between the parties for the alleged Option or agreement to purchase the Buildings.
In fact, the Nicholsons admit no consideration was exchanged. 5 The lack of consideration is
fatal to the Nicholsons' claim for breach of contract.
The alleged Option agreement is also too indefinite to be enforced as a contract. "An
agreement for the sale of real property is invalid unless the agreement or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent." Hoffman

5

"[No consideration] other than continued maintenance of the property and payment of annual
rents to Coeur d'Alene Placer." Aff. T De Smet, Ex. A (Interrogatory No. 7). Maintenance of the
Property and payment of rent are not consideration; they're preexisting contractual obligations,
pursuant to the Land Lease.
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v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981). "A property description that
does not allow the court to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to be transfened is inadequate."

Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 90,233 P.3d 18, 21 (2008).
"For a land sale contract to be specifically enforced, the contract must typically contain the
minimum provisions of the parties involved, the subject matter thereof, the price or
consideration, a description of the property, and all the essential terms of the agreement.'' P.O.

Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870, 875
(2007).
There is no evidence on this record of a written Option between the parties; let alone, a
written contract containing the names of the parties, purchase price, consideration, description
of the Property or any other essential terms of a contract. In fact, the Nicholsons admit they
never discussed a purchase price, no consideration was given, and no legal description was
specified. Aff. T. De Srnet, Ex. A (Interrogatory No. 7). The alleged Option is too indefinite to
be enforced.
No genuine issue of material fact exists, the Nicholsons' claim for breach of contract
fails as a matter of law.
Additionally, CDA Placer and IFG are not precluded from asserting the statute of frauds
as a defense to the Nicholsons breach of contract claim. "A party who is induced to rely on an
oral agreement and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be defrauded by a [party]
who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid. Idaho Migrant Council,

Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. 110 Idaho 804, 807, 718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1986).
The Nicholsons assert they relied on the alleged oral Option and agreement to purchase
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the Buildings by making improvements and maintaining the Property and by residing on the
Property. Pursuant to the preexistin~ duty rule, 6 this does not constitute reliance, chang~ i~
position or consideration for the alleged oral agreements.
The Nicholsons entered into a valid Land Lease. The Land Lease provides:

"MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY. TENANT agrees to maintain the Property in
the same condition as it is in at the commencement of the Term or such better condition
as it may be put in during the Term of this Lease ... "
The Nicholsons had a preexisting contractual obligation to maintain the Property.
Maintaining the Property does not constitute a detriment to the Nicholsons and the statute of
frauds applies to bar the Nicholsons claim for breach of the alleged Option agreement.
The Land Lease also provides:

ALTERATIONS OR ADDITIONS. TENANT shall not make improvements
on, or alterations or additions to, the Property unless LANDLORD consents
thereto in advance in writing, which consent may be withheld in LANDLORD's
sole discretion .... Any improvements, alterations or improvements made by
TENANT shall become the property of LANDLORD unless removed by
TENANT at the termination of occupancy as provided herein."
There is no evidence on this record that CDA Placer or IFG gave the Nicholsons written
consent to make any improvements to the Property. If the Nicholsons made improvements,
they did so in violation of the Land Lease. Reliance must be reasonable. Smith v. Boise

Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 (1981) (in the context of a claim

6 " ••• When

a party has a contractual duty to perform a specified act, the performance or
agreement to perform the act does not constitute a legal detriment, since the actor had a
preexisting legal duty to perform the act, and the performance or agreement to perform the act
cannot, therefore, constitute consideration for any promise made by a third-party. Likewise,
if instead of performing, the party previously bound promises to perform what it has already
undertaken, its promise does not constitute a detriment. Williston on Contracts§ 7.40 Promise
to Perform or Performance ofPreexisting Obligation other than Debt.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR S ~
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for promissory estoppel). Violating the Land Lease is not reasonable reliance. Even then,

..

under the Land Lease, the Nicholsons· agreed any improvements they made to the Property are
now the property of CDA Placer or IFG. This was a bargained for contractual obligation.
Ownership of the improvements is incidental to the Land Lease-not reliance, consideration or
a change in position.
Residing on the Property does not constitute reliance. The Land Lease provided the
Nicholsons the right to reside on the Property. The right to reside on the Property was
incidental to leasing the Property-not reliance or a change in position.
There is no evidence on the record that the Nicholsons changed position to their
determinant because of an alleged oral agreement or that the Nicholson were induced to rely
on an alleged oral agreement. As a matter of law, the alleged Option and agreement to
purchase Buildings are unenforceable and the Nicholsons' claim for breach of contract fails.
II.

The Nicholsons' Claim for Promissory Estoppel Fails as a Matter of
Law.

Promissory estoppel requires "(1) the detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in
an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have
been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in
justifiable reliance on the promise as made." Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC., 138
Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002).
The Nicholsons' promissory estoppel claim fails for the same reasons as their claim for
breach of contract. Promissory estoppel cannot apply to enforce an unenforceable or indefinite
contract. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005);
(holding, "Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an
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agreement between the parties."); citing Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63,

.

.

68,625 P.2d 417,422 (1981); (holding, promissory estoppel is " ... not[} a substitute for an
agreement between the parties. ").

In Lettunich, the plaintiff claimed he had an oral agreement with the bank to loan him
money to purchase cattle. The Court held the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable based
upon the statute of frauds (I.C. § 9-505(5).). The plaintiff also argued that promissory estoppel
should be used to prevent the bank from denying the enforceability of the oral promise. The
Court disagreed; holding, based upon the statute of frauds, there was no complete promise to
be enforced and promissory estoppel could not be used to enforce an unenforceable agreement.
Promissory estoppel is not an exception to the statute of frauds.
Here, no enforceable contract exists based upon the statute of frauds, indefiniteness of
terms and absence of evidence of any contract on this record. As a matter of law, promissory
estoppel does not apply and the Nicholsons' claim fails.
Ill.

The Nicholsons' Claim for Specific Performance Fails as a Matter of
Law.

"Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to comply with the statute of frauds
are unenforceable for obtaining specific performance or damages." Bauchman-Kingston
Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 91, 233 P.3d 18, 22 (2008). "The failure to
comply with the statute of frauds renders the agreement unenforceable both in an action at law
for damages and in a suit in equity for specific performance. Lexington Heights Development,
LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 285, 92 P.3d 526, 535 (2004); citing Garner v. Barschi,
139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003).
Again, no enforceable contract exists. Specific performance does not apply and the
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Nicholsons' claim fails as a matter of law.
IV.

The Nicholsons' Claim for Unjust Enrichment Fails as a Matter of
Law.

"Unjust enrichment requires "( 1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to
accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit." Teton Peaks, Inv. Co., LLC v.

Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 195 P.3d 1207 (2008).
The Nicholsons claim they conferred a benefit upon CDA Placer and IFG because they
improved and maintained the Property and because they cannot remove the Buildings without
rendering them "valueless." Complaint,

~~

6.1-6. 7.

a. The Nicholsons have not conferred any benefit on CDA Placer or IFG and it
would equitable for CDA Placer or IFG to retain ownership of any
improvements.

A tenant cannot recover for improvement to the lease premises if the landlord did not
have knowledge of or consent to the improvements. See Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 457,
567 P.2d 1, 2 (1997) (stating "The [landlord} approved the work of[the tenant} from its outset

with knowledge of the expenditures of the money and time."); see also Haskin v. Glass, 102
Idaho 785,788,640 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Land Lease provides:
TENANT shall not make improvements on, or alterations or additions to, the
Property unless LANDLORD consents thereto in advance in writing, which
consent may be withheld in LANDLOR'S sole discretion ... Any improvements,
alterations or improvements made by TENANT shall become the property of
LANDLORD unless removed by TENANT at the termination of occupancy as
provided herein.
There is no evidence on this record that CDA Placer or IFG ever agreed, in writing, to

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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allow the Nicholsons to make any improvements, alterations or additions to the Property.
Thus, even if the Nicholsons ~ade improvements to the Property, they did so at thei; o~n risk
and are precluded from asserting a claim for unjust enrichment.
"The burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts showing that the defendant received a
benefit and the amount of that benefit." Kinzer v. Westgate, 129 Idaho 621,625,931 P.2d 1, 5
(Ct. App. 1997.

The Nicholsons still own the Buildings-not CDA Placer or IFG.

The

Nicholsons admit as much. A.ff. T De Smet, Ex. A (RFA No. 21). 7 The Nicholsons are free to
remove the Buildings from the Property. 8 Absent ownership of the Buildings or use of the
Buildings, the Buildings are not a benefit to CDA Placer or IFG. 9
The Nicholsons also claim they conferred a benefit by maintaining or improving the
Property. Again, maintaining the Property was a preexisting duty under the Land Lease, which
does not constitute a benefit or consideration. Any improvements made to the Property were
done without the written permission of CDA Placer, in violation of the Land Lease; and, the
Nicholsons agreed such improvements would become the property of CDA Placer or IFG.
These are contractual obligations and the benefit, if any, is incidental to the Land Lease and
does not constitute a separate benefit. For the same reason, it is equitable for CDA Placer or
IFG to retain benefits from the Land Lease-this is the benefit of their bargain. 10

The

7

In fact, the Nicholsons unlawfully remain on the Property and reside in the Buildings.
Whether or not the Buildings would be damaged by removal, is irrelevant. This is a risk that the
Nicholsons undertook in purchasing the Buildings.
9
CDA Placer does not own the Property or have possession of the Buildings.
10
Similarly, it is not inequitable for CDA Placer or IFG to retain ownership of the Buildings or be
liable for them because the parties agreed "LANDLORD disclaims ownership of any buildings or
trailer located on the Property and TENANT agrees that LANDLORD shall have no responsibility
or liability of any kind in connection therewith." A.ff T De Smet, Ex. B. The Nicholsons bargained
for and accepted the risk ofloss of the Buildings and no inequitable result will follow.
8
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Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim fails for want of any benefit conferred or resulting
inequity.
b. There is no evidence on this record that the buildings or improvements
increase the fair market value of the Property.

"To recover for improvements made to property, the claimant must establish the
increase in the fair market value of the property that is attributable to the improvements."
Kinzer at 625, 5; citing Hines v. Wells, 120 Idaho 177,179,814 P.2d 437,439 (Ct.App.1991).

CDA Placer and IFG have no use for the Buildings. By the Nicholsons own admission, the
Buildings are worthless if removed. 11 There is no evidence on this record that the Buildings
or alleged improvements to the Property increase the fair market value of the Property. Absent
such evidence the Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim fails.
c. The Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim fails because an adequate remedy
exists at law.

The equitable remedy of unjust enrichment cannot apply when an adequate remedy at
law exists based on an express agreement. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 642, 249 P.3d
829, 835 (2011 ). "Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express
contract covering the same subject matter." Id. "The reason for this rule ... is that the remedies
for breach of an express contract, whether by law or by express agreement, afford adequate
relief." Id.; quoting Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.
1985).
The Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim seeks compensation for the alleged benefit of

11

Removing the Buildings will certainly cost money. The Buildings are a burden on the Propertynot a benefit.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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the Buildings, as well as maintenance and improvement of the Property. Complaint,

,r 6.1-6. 7.

.

.

The Land Lease covers the subject matter of ownership and liability for the Buildings and
maintenance and improvements to the Property. The Nicholsons could have sued for breach
of the Land Lease. The Land Lease provides an adequate remedy at law. The Nicholsons'
unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, no genuine issue of material fact exists as a matter of law.
CDA Placer and IFG are entitled to summary judgment on the Nicholsons' claims.
DATED this

6th

day of February, 2015.

onJ
Atto
s for Coeur d'Alene Placer
Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

X US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 752-1900

James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

Th
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JAMES McMILLAN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900
ISB # 7523
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,

Case No.

CV-14-375

OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants and Counter-claimant

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W.

MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON (hereinafter "Counter-

defendants"), by and through their Counsel of Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law,
and hereby OBJECTS to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts from Plaintiffs' standpoint are sufficiently set forth in the Verified Complaint on
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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file herein, and in Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, also on file
herein.
In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Defendants are "entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record

in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor
of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991)
(emphasis added).
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an]
issue for trial [if] there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a

verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) (emphasis
added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit, construing the Federal rule
upon which the Idaho rule is modeled, further explained the term "genuine" as being
"sufficiently open-ended to permit a rationalfactfinder to resolve the issue infavor either side."

National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1995). In the same case, it
further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation
under the applicable law." Id. To put it another way, as the summary judgment standard is often
explained by law professors, summary judgment is appropriate only if "reasonable minds cannot
differ" as to the position offered by the moving party, based upon the evidence available in the
record.
As such, for the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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DENIED, and Plaintiffs' claims should be allowed to proceed to trial on this matter.
II.
1.

ARGUMENT

Defendants' Affidavit Contains Exhibits Lacking Foundation and Contains

Inadmissible Hearsay.

In support of their Motion, Defendants offer only an affidavit from Counsel, essentially
attaching Plaintiffs' Discovery responses in their entirety, and including various correspondence
and representations not only from Plaintiffs, but from Kevin Boling, Gail Wolfhart, Elizabeth
Gardner, Wilfred Gardner, and others. Affidavit of Theron DeSmet, Exhibit C. Defendants offer

no Affidavits from any of the aforementioned individuals and, attempt to offer, through their
attorney, evidence contained in the various pieces of correspondence for the proof of the matters
asserted. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 8-9 (reference to statements
made by Kevin Boling in correspondence, but cited to its location in Defendants' unverified
Answer). Moreover, the Lease Agreement at issue is, again, attached simply as an Exhibit to an
affidavit of counsel, with no foundation from an agent of Coeur d'Alene Placer that would allow
for its admissibility. Affidavit of Theron DeSmet, Exhibit B.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that affidavits "be made on personal
knowledge, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Idaho R. Civ.
P. 56(e). In this case, the statements contained in the correspondence from Boling and others are
inadmissible hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence 802. Furthermore, the Lease Agreement is
unsupported by proper foundation for its admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Finally, the Discovery Responses contained in Exhibit A are only admissible to the extent that
they may be considered Admissions of a Party Opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2). Therefore, the aforementioned portions of the Affidavit of Theron DeSmet should be
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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STRICKEN accordingly.

.
Furthermore, "a verified complaint may be presented to the court in support of a motion
for summary judgment if it meets the requirements of Rule 56(e). " Camp v. Jimenez, l 07 Idaho
878, 881, 693 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ct. App. 1984).

As such, Plaintiffs' Complaint may be

considered for the purposes of Summary Judgment. In contrast, Defendants' Answers and
Counterclaim are not verified pleadings, which do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e).
Therefore, given the inadmissibility of the evidence offered in Defendants' supporting affidavit,
viewing the remaining evidence on the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
there remain genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiffs' claims and defenses.

Thus,

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED ..
2.

Defendants' Statute of Frauds Defense.

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants rely heavily upon Idaho Code §§ 9503 and 28-2-201, Idaho's Statutes of Frauds, as a defense to the claims for Breach of Contract,
Promissory Estoppel, and Specific Performance. Defendants' Memorandum, 7-9.
However, to the extent that the Statute of Frauds would apply, it is well established in
Idaho law that "a [party] who is induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position
to his own detriment cannot be defrauded by a [party] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to
declare the agreement invalid."

Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life

Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 804, 807, 718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ct. App. 1986). In the Idaho Migrant
Council case, the Court also went on to say that, "since IMC's complaint states sufficient facts on
its face to support a claim of reliance, Northwestern may not interpose the Statute of Frauds ... "
Id
Similarly, in this case, the Plaintiffs have stated many facts in their Complaint to support
a claim for reliance.

See Complaint,

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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2.5-2.9, 4.2-4.3.

Since Defendants did not submit
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additional affidavits based upon personal knowledge or admissible evidence in support of their
motion, Plaintiffs' allegations remain uncontroverted. Since it cannot be said that, viewing the
allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is clear that the Plaintiff is
entitled to no relief on this basis, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be
DENIED on the grounds that Plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of material fact that
Defendants are estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds based on Plaintiffs substantial
reliance upon the oral agreement.
3.

Defendants' Claim that there was No Breach of the Right of First Refusal.

Alternatively, Defendants claim that Coeur d'Alene Placer followed through with
honoring the right of first refusal, but claim that Plaintiffs declined to purchase the property.
Defendants' Memorandum at 8. However, in doing so, they cite to hearsay statements from a
letter from Kevin Boling and a later offer from Plaintiffs (which was made following receipt of
the letter to Plaintiffs from Coeur d'Alene Placer stating that Coeur d'Alene Placer was
terminating the lease), and offer no further evidence that Coeur d'Alene Placer had any intent on
following through with a sale to Plaintiffs. Further, Plaintiffs' allegations differ from Defendants'
version of events with regard to the communications with Boling. See Complaint, ,r,r 2.10-2.12,
2.17. Thus, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs were not given
the opportunity to purchase the property pursuant to their right of first refusal, and, therefore,
Defendants are not entitled to Summary Judgment.
4.

Promissory Estoppel and Consideration.

With regard to Plaintiffs' claim for Promissory Estoppel, Defendants largely rely upon the
case of Lettunich v. Key Bank, NA., 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 362 (2005). In that case, after
finding a lack of an underlying agreement, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the
doctrines of either equitable or promissory estoppel. Id. at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109.
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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In this case, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, this Court could
reasonably find that there was an agreement between the parties that Plaintiffs had right of first
refusal, and that Defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer had agreed to purchase the buildings in the event
of a termination of the lease. The Gardners, agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer, repeatedly assured
Plaintiffs that they would either purchase the buildings or allow Plaitniffs to purchase the land.
Affidavit of Theron DeSmet, Exhibit A, Page 6 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 4) Plaintiffs having
sufficiently raised the issue of an underlying agreement, this court is free to examine the issues
regarding reliance and equitable or promissory estoppel.

As such, Defendants have failed to

establish that they are entitled to Summary Judgment, and their motion should be denied.
5.

Pre-existing Duty and Improvements
Defendants also raise the issues that (a) the Plaintiffs had a pre-existing legal duty to

maintain the Property; and (b) that the improvements to the property were in violation of the Lease
Agreement.
With regard to the pre-existing duty to maintain the Property, Plaintiffs simply agreed to
"maintain the property in the same condition as it is at the commencement of the Term or such
better condition as it may be put in during the Term of this Lease." Affidavit of Theron DeSmet,
Exhibit B (hereinafter "Lease Agreement"),

,r 8.

However, as Plaintiffs state in their Answer to

Interrogatory No. 9, they went above and beyond this contractual duty by placing a well into
service; installing a pump and well house; cleaning up the property; and enhancing the property by
restoring a garden plot. Affidavit of Theron DeSmet, Exhibit A, page 9. As such, a rational trier of
fact could reasonably find that this amounted to reliance on the part of the Plaintiffs, and that
Defendants were enriched by the same.
With regard to the contractual prov1s1on requmng written consent to improvements,
Plaintiffs state that, on numerous occasions, agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer regularly visited the
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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Property, saw, and consented to the improvements. Id. at Page 10 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 10).
By doing so, and failing to take action against the Plaintiffs, a rational trier of fact could likewise
reasonably conclude that Coeur d'Alene Placer implicitly waived the requirement that any such
consent be in writing.
Therefore, there are genuine issues of material fact that the maintenance and improvements
to the Property were beyond the minimum contractual duty, and that Coeur d'Alene Placer
consented to the same. Thus, Summary Judgment should be DENIED on that basis as well.
6.

Uniust Enrichment.

Finally, Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim. Defendants' Memorandum 14-17. In this portion of their Motion, in addition to
re-iterating the issues over pre-existing duty and improvements addressed above, Defendants make
statements, unsupported by Affidavit, that the buildings do not confer a benefit upon the Property,
that Defendants have no use for the buildings, and allege, contrary to Paragraphs 2.9 and 6.2 of
Plaintiffs' Complaint, that Defendants did not consent to, or have knowledge of, Plaintiffs'
improvements to the Property. Defendants' Memorandum at 14-16. However, as these statements
conclusory and unsupported by anything in the record outside of Defendants' Memorandum, this
Court should not consider them as true for the purposes of rendering Summary Judgment.
Therefore, once again, viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Defendants have failed to establish that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and their
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

II

II
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III.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be DENIED.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2015.
JAMES McMILLAN,

.Wttc;mey for Plaintiffs

<) ') :::,

{_ ~ ',..,,J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of March, 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. DeSmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_x__ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

#amesMcMillan
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
. 700 Northw~st Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-375
DEFENDANTS' REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.
Defendants Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company, ("CDA Placer") and IFG Timber,
LLC ("IFG") submit their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Nicholsons assert claims against CDA Placer for breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, specific performance, and unjust enrichment. The Nicholsons only assert a claim for
unjust enrichment against IFG. CDA Placer and IFG are entitled to summary judgment on all of
the Nicholsons' claims.

I.

The Affidavit of Theron J. De Smet and Exhibits are Admissible and the
Nicholsons' Motion to Strike Should be Denied.
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The Nicholsons move the Court to strike the Affidavit of Theron J. De Smet ("Affidavit")
on the basis that the Affidavit or Exhibits lacks foundation and contain hearsay. Obj. Opp. MSJ,

p. 3, 4.
The correspondence attached to the Affidavit is not hearsay. The statements contained in
the correspondence are admissions by a party opponent, in its representative capacity, or
statements by the Nicholsons.

These are not hearsay and are admissible. !R.E. 801 (d) (2).

Furthermore, the Nicholsons have admitted the authenticity of the correspondence from Kevin
Boling and Michael Branstetter and that the correspondence "speaks for itself." Answer to IFG

Counterclaim,

,r,r 2. 5-2.16.

The Nicholsons also produced the correspondence in response to

discovery, as correspondence "made by plaintiffs or defendants regarding the allegations in [the]
Complaint or the transactions or occurrences upon which the Complaint is based." A.ff T De

Smet, Ex. A. (RFD 3). The correspondence attached to the Affidavit is admissible.
The Land Lease attached to the Affidavit does not lack foundation and is admissible. The
Land Lease is a contract between the Nicholsons and CDA Placer. It is an act of independent
legal significance and not hearsay. Further, the Nicholsons were requested to produce" ... a copy
of each and every lease agreement and amendment or modification to such, as identified in the
Complaint." A.ff. T De Smet, Ex. A (RFD 7).

The Nicholsons produced the Land Lease,

correspondence and cancelled checks in response to the Request, which are attached to the
Affidavit as Exhibits B and C. The Land Lease, related correspondence and cancelled checks
have adequate foundation, have been authenticated and are admissible.
The Affidavit and Exhibits are properly before the Court and should be considered for the
purpose of summary judgment. The Nicholsons' Motion to Strike should be denied.
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II.

.

The Nicholsons' Breach of Contract Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.
.

The Nicholsons breach of contract claim is based upon an alleged breach of an oral option
and agreement to purchase the buildings in the event of termination of the Land Lease. There is
no evidence on this record of a written option or agreement to purchase the buildings. The
Nicholsons do not contest this. 1 The Nicholson also do not contest that the statute of frauds
contained in Idaho Code §§ 9-503 and 28-2-201 applies to bar enforcement of the alleged
agreements. Rather, the Nicholsons argue that CDA Placer is prevented from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense because the Nicholsons purportedly relied on the agreements to their
detriment. Obj. Opp. MSJ, p. 4, 5. The Nicholsons' position is unfounded.
The Nicholsons assert they relied on the alleged oral option and agreement to purchase
the buildings by improving and maintaining the property and by residing on the property.
Pursuant to the preexisting duty rule, this does not constitute reliance, change in position or
consideration for the alleged oral agreements. Under the Land Lease, the Nicholsons had a
preexisting contractual duty to maintain the property and right to reside on the property. The
Nicholsons did not have the right to make alterations or improvements to the property. If they
did, the Nicholsons violated the Land Lease. This is not reasonable reliance and even then,
the Nicholsons agreed any improvements became the property of CDA Placer. This was a
bargained for contractual obligation incidental to the Land Lease-not reliance.
There is no evidence on this record that the Nicholsons changed their position to their
detriment because of alleged oral agreements or that the Nicholsons were induced to rely on

1

CDA Placer and IFG requested the Nicholsons produce a copy of the alleged option and
agreement to purchase the buildings in discovery. The Nicholsons did not produce any such option
or agreement. Aff. T. De Smet, Ex. A (RPD 8, 9).
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alleged oral agreements. CDA Placer is entitled to assert the statute of frauds as a defense to

.

.

the Nicholsons' breach of contract claim and the claim fails as a matter of law.
III.

Even if the alleged Option was Enforceable There was No Breach of
Contract Because the Nicholsons Were Provided the Opportunity to
Purchase the Property and, in Fact, Made an Offer to Purchase the
Property.

The Nicholsons attack CDA Placer's position by arguing the correspondence from Kevin
Boling is hearsay and inadmissible. Again, the Nicholsons have verified the authenticity of Mr.
Boling's correspondence and the statements contained therein. Mr. Boling's correspondence
demonstrates that CDA Placer offered to allow the Nicholsons to purchase the property on at least
three occasions.
However, most importantly, the Nicholsons made an offer to purchase the property. The
Nicholsons admit this, but ignore this fact in opposing summary judgment. A.ff T. De Smet, Ex.

A (RFA 7, 8). (On March 6, 2014, Nicholsons' counsel wrote to then counsel for CDA Placer,
Michael Branstetter, and offered to purchase the property for annual rents already paid. IFG
Counterclaim, ~ 12, Ex. H

2
).

CDA Placer offered to allow the Nicholsons to purchase the property and the Nicholsons,
in fact, offered to purchase the property. Even if the alleged option was enforceable, CDA Placer
did not breach the option and their breach of contract claim fails. CDA Placer and IFG are entitled
to summary judgment.
IV.

The Nicholsons Ignore the Fact that the Alleged Option Agreement is Too
Indefinite to Be Enforced as a Contract.

2

The Nicholsons have admitted the authenticity of Exhibit Hand Exhibit I to IFG's Counterclaim.
Answer to Counterclaim, ,I 2.12, 2.13.
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It is well settled in Idaho that, in addition to being in writing, in order for a contract for
the sale of real property to be valid, the contract must identify the parties involved, contain an
adequate description of the real property, price or consideration, and all the essential terms of an
agreement. 3 The Nicholsons completely ignore this fact in opposing summary judgment.
There is no evidence on this record of a written option between the paities; let alone, a
written contract containing the names of the parties, purchase price, consideration, description
of the property or any other essential terms of a contract. The alleged option agreement is too
indefinite to be enforced and CDA Placer is entitled to summary judgment.

V.

The Nicholsons' Promissory Estoppel Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.

Promissory estoppel cannot apply to enforce an unenforceable or indefinite contract.

Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). In
Lettunich, the Supreme Court held that promissory estoppel could not be used to enforce an
oral contract that was unenforceable based upon the statue of frauds. Id.
The Nicholsons appear to argue that there is some indicia of an agreement and
therefore, the Court is free to examine the issues of promissory estoppel. Obj. Opp. MSJ, p. 5,
6. This is wrong-it's putting the cart before the horse.

The alleged option and agreement to purchase the buildings upon termination of the
Land Lease are unenforceable based upon the statute of frauds and lack of definiteness. The
Court does not need to not analyze the issue any further. Promissory estoppel does not apply

3

See Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981); BauchmanKingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 90,233 P.3d 18, 21 (2008); and P.O.
Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870, 875
(2007).
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as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper.

VI.

The Nicholsons' Claim for Specific Performance Fails as a Matter of
Law.

"Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to comply with the statute of frauds
are unenforceable for obtaining specific performance or damages." Bauchman-Kingston

Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 91, 233 P.3d 18, 22 (2008). The Nicholsons do
not oppose this well settled law. As set forth above, no enforceable contract exists and the
Nicholsons' claim for specific performance fails as a matter oflaw.

VII.

The Nicholsons' Claim for Unjust Enrichment Fails as a Matter of Law.

"Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract
covering the same subject matter." Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636,642,249 P.3d 829, 835
(2011 ). The Nicholsons ignore this.
The Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim seeks compensation for the alleged benefit of
the buildings, maintenance and improvements to the property. The Land Lease covers these
matters. The Nicholsons have an adequate remedy at law-sue for breach of the Land Lease.
Having adequate legal remedy; the Nicholsons' equitable unjust enrichment claim fails.
Moreover, the Nicholsons have not conferred a benefit on CDA Placer or IFG. A tenant
cannot recover for improvement to the lease premises if the landlord did not have knowledge
of or consent to the improvements. See Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 457, 567 P.2d 1, 2
( 1997). The Land Lease requires the written consent of CDA Placer to make improvements.

Aff. T De Smet, Ex. B. There is no evidence on this record that CDA Placer or IFG gave written
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consent for the Nicholsons to make improvements to the property. 4
The Nicholsons do not contest this fact. Instead, the Nicholsons argue that CDA Placer
impliedly waived this express requirement of the Land Lease. Obj. Opp. MSJ, p. 6, 7.

The

Land Lease is integrated and contains a "No Waiver" provision. 5 CDA Placer did not waive
the written consent for improvements provision of the Land Lease. CDA Placer did not
consent to any improvement made by the Nicholsons. The Nicholsons have not conferred a
benefit on CDA Placer or IFG and their unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim fails because it is not inequitable
for CDA Placer or its successor, IFG, to retain the alleged improvements. As discussed above,
the Land Lease provides that any improvements to the property would become the property of
CDA Placer or IFG. Maintaining the property was also a condition of Land Lease. The
Nicholsons and CDA Placer agreed to these terms. Enforcing the contractual agreement of the
parties in not inequitable. (Hence why, the Nicholsons have an adequate remedy at law under

the Land Lease).

4

The Nicholsons' sole cause of action against IFG is for unjust enrichment. AjJ. T De Smet, Ex. A
(RFA 12-16). A tenant cannot recover for improvement to the lease premises if the landlord did
not have knowledge of or consent to the improvements. The Nicholsons admit that IFG never
gave them permission to make improvements and that they never advised IFG they were making
improvements to the property. Aff. T De Smet, Ex. A (RFA 18, 19). Absent the knowledge and
consent of IFG, the Nicholsons' claim for unjust enrichment fails and IFG is properly dismissed
on summary judgment.
5 "NO WAIVER. No consent or waiver, express or implied, by LANDLORD or TENANT
to or of any breach of any covenant, condition or duty of the other shall be construed as a
consent or waiver to or of any other breach of the same or of any other covenant, condition or
duty ... .If any action by TENANT or LANDLORD shall require consent or approval of the
other, such consent to or approval of such action on any one occasion shall not be deemed a
consent to or approval of such action on any subsequent occasion or a consent to or approval
of any other action on the same or any subsequent occasion ... " Aff. T De Smet, Ex. B.
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The burden is on the Nicholsons to show CDA Placer or IFG received a benefit. Kinzer

.

.

v. Westgate, 129 Idaho 621, 625, 931 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1997). It is undisputed that the
Nicholsons still own the buildings on the property and they are free to remove them. Absent
ownership, the Nicholsons have not confeITed a benefit on CDA Placer or IFG.
The Nicholsons' unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law because the
Nicholsons have an adequate remedy at law, they have not confe1Ted a benefit on CDA Placer
or IFG, and it is equitable for CDA Placer or IFG to retain the alleged improvements. CDA
Placer and IFG are entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, no genuine issue of material fact exists on the Nicholsons'
claims and CDA Placer and IFG are entitled to summary judgment as a matter oflaw.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of March, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

US Mail
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Calls case - Mr. Desmet and Mr. McMillen present. Motion for
summary judgment. Reviews documents read in preparation for
this file.

Mr.
McMillen

Argues motion to strike. Correspondence which doesn't come
from the Nickelsons are inadmissible. Not admitting to truth of
matter asserted. They are inadmissible as hearsay. Only thing
admissible is the affidavit of Mr. Desmet. Easily obtained affidavits
from individuals. Defendant's pleadings are not verified pleadings.
Motion that they be stricken as hearsay.

Mr.
Desmet

Attached to counterclaim. These documents were produced in
specific request for production of documents. All documents are
admissible and court should deny motion to strike.

J

Exhibit A- motion to strike is denied. Admission of party
opponent. Hearsay objection is met. Land lease is signed by the
Nickelsons, don't know why it isn't admission of party opponent.
Not subject to hearsay. Exhibit C is a variety of correspondence,
based on the reason for motion for Summary Judgment, don't
know how relevant putting things in context. Portion of exhibit C
are admissions of party opponent. Motion to strike is only granted
to some portions of exhibit C. Mr. McMillan to prepare order.

Mr.
Desmet

Makes an offer of proof by showing some documents to court.
This case isn't overly complex. Put some buildings on some
property. Property was sold to IFG and their lease was
terminated. They don't have a right to be there and are not paying
rent. No evidence or anything writing. They are oral agreements
only. Breach of contract. Resided on property, maintained it and
improved. Pre existing duties. Written consent was needed in
order to make any improvements to property. If plaintiffs made
improvements violates the land lease. Land lease improvements
become property of my client. There hasn't been any reliance
shown on he record. Contract for sale of real property requires
price, legal description, etc. We don't have any evidence of this on
record. My clients have not breached anything. Plaintiffs were
given a chance to make an offer to purchase of property. My client
denied the offer. My client's haven't breached any obligation.
Summary judgment would be proper. Promissory estople - valid
?
enforceable contract. Barred by statute of fraud. Unjust
enrichment - land lease. Improvements - land lease provides for~ J
this. Land lease is their remedy of law. Sue for breach of land

04:04:32 PM
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lease. Pre existing duty. Buildings still belong to plaintiff's.
Plaintiff's have an adequate remedy of law. Unjust enrichment
clairn should fail.
.
·
04:25:25 PM

Mr.
McMillan

Unsettled law. Discovery responses and pleadings - numerous
referrals to the Gardners. Uncontroverted. Gardners visited
multiple times and reassure Nickelsons would be given right of
first refusal. Extent in which plaintiffs cared for property, went
above and beyond simple contractual duty. Restored garden plot.
Contract does state that improvements must be consented to in
writing. Gardners saw the improvements and expressed their
approval. Nickelsons would have right to first refusal. All we have
is what was raised in complaint, answer to discovery responses
and denial. CDA Placer didn't follow thru. Unjust enrichment - if
NickelsonS are forced to leave property - no way they can take
buildings off the property. They would be forfeiting them. Based
upon evidence in record submitted, they would receive a value.
Based upon the evidence in record, genuine issues of material
fact. Ask that court deny Summary judgment.

Mr.
Desmet

Agreed to term that my client are to keep the buildings. Client's
knew there was potential sale of property. Promissory estople still
requires a valid and enforceable contract. This is not case here.
Benefit - plaintiff's bought these buildings. My client didn't sell
them. Court should enforce contract. Ask that summary judgment
be entered.

J

Summary judgment is warranted in all aspect to both defendants.
One of the basis is that Rule 56c requires that plaintiff in response
be filed by 14 days before hearing. It was 4 days late. No request
for relief from that rule. Cites case law. Time limits apply unless
court shortens it for good cause. Appropriate remedy to grant SJ
on this defect alone. There is no written contract under statue of
frauds. There is no written contract submitted in evidence
provided. The plaintiff's don't dispute that there is no written
contract. Nothing here but a verbal contract, when it isn't allowed
under statute of frauds. No valid contract. Unjust enrichment
doesn't gain any support with the court. Plaintiff's could sue under
land lease, but don't know that land lease has been violated. Can't
force the defendants into a lease or other owner status. For all of
those reasons, motion for summary judgment is granted. Mr.
Desmet to prepare separate order and proposed judgment.

04:33:51 PM

04:36:42 PM

04:47:05 PM Mr.
Desmet

Nothing further.

04:47:17 PM Mr.
McMillen

Nothing further.

04:47:25 PM End
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 North,vest BoulevZ1rd

P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
:Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM: MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
\V. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-375

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONFORPARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG

TUvIDER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.
This matter having come before the Cornt on Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment on plaintiffs' cfaims and plaintiffs, \Villiam and Joan Nicholson (''plaintiffs")
being represented by James McMillan and defendants, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp.
("CDA Placer") and IFG Timber LLC ("IFG") being represented by Theron J. De Smet,
and the Couit having considered the filings of the parties, the records in this matter and the

oral arguments of counsel, the Court finds as follows.
I.

CDA PLACER IS ENTITLED TO SUlVfMARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAlNTIFFS' BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
040
:_
u
Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of contract against defendant CDA Placer based
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upon an alleged option ("Option'') to purchase the subject real property ("Propertyll) and an
alleged agreement whereby CDA Placer would purchase buildings ("Buildings") on the
Property in the event that a Land Lease ("Land Lease"), betYveen CDA Placer and the
plaintiffs, was terminated. (The Option and agreement to purchase the Buildings shall be
collectively referred to as "the Agreements''). No evidence exists on this record that the
Agreements were reduced to writing. To the extent the Agreements ,vere made, if at all, the
agreements were or!:1I. The statute of frauds conrained in Idaho Code §§ 9-503 and 28-2201, requires the Agreement be in writing to be enforceable. 1 The agreements upon which
plaintiffs base their breach of contract cbirn are oral agreements and unenforceable pursuant
to the statute of frauds as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails.
This Court recognized that exceptions to the statute of frauds exist, namely ,vhen "A
party who is induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his

O\Vn

detriment cannot be defrauded by a [party] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare
the agreement invalid. Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
110 Idaho 804,807, 718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1986).
Plaintiffs argue that they relied to their detriment on the Agreements by residing on
the Property and improving and maintaining the Property and therefore the stah1te of frauds
does not bar enforcement. Plft. Opp. J\1SJ, p. 4, 5; citing Complaint,

~~

2.5-2 9, 4.2-4.3.

The Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument and finds no evidence in the record to
create a genuine issue of fact on the matter.

1A

first right of refusal or option to purchase real property is .:111 interest in real property that must
be in writing to be enforceable. Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idftho 476, 197 P.3d 789 (Ct. App. 2008);
Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P.2d 925 (1968).
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The plaintiffs entered into a valid Land Lease for the Property with CDA Placer.

.
Ajf. T. De Smet in Supp. MSJ, Ex. C. The Land Lease expressly provided plaintiffs the right

to reside on the Property and obligated the plaintiffs to maintain the Property. Id. Residing

on the Prope1ty and maintaining the Property does not constitute reliance-it was a
preexisting contractual duty or right based upon the Land Lease. Id. Similarly, improving
the Property does not constitute reliance. Pursuant to the Land Lease, plaintiffs were
required to obtain written consent to make any improvements to the Property. There is no
evidence on this record demonstrating plaintiffs obtained ·written consent to make
improvements to the Property. If plaintiffs made improvements, they did so in violation of
the Land Lease. Reliance must be reasonable. Smzth v. Boise Kemvorth Sales, Inc., 102
Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 (1981) (in the contexr of a claim for promiss01y
estoppd).

Violating the Land Lease does not constitute reasonable reliance.

Furthermore, the Land Lease expressly provides that CDA Placer is entitled to ownership

of any improvements made to the Property. AjJ. T De Smet in Sipp. MSJ, Ex. C.
No genuine issue of material fact exists on this record. Plaintiffs did not rely to their
detriment on the Agreements. As a matter of law, the statute of frauds applies and the
Agreements are unenforceable. I. C. §§ 9-503 and 28-2-201, Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim fails and CDA Placer is entitled to summa1y judgment.
Even if the oral agreements were excepted from the statute of frauds and otherwise
enforceable, this Court finds, as a matter oflaw, CDA Placer did not breach the Agreements.
The undisputed facts on this record demonstrates on March 6, 2014, plaintiffs, through their
counsel, offered to purchase the Property from CDA Placer for the annual tents already
paid. !FG Answe,· and Counterclaim, Ex. H.

While the offer was rejected, it was
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nonetheless, made and as a matter of law, plaintiffs exercised their alleged Option. No

.

.

genuine issue of marerial fact exists. As a matter of law, CDA Placer did not breach the
alleged Option and plaintiffs) breach of contract claim fails.

11.

CDA PLACER IS ENTITLED TO SUM1VIARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Promiss01y estoppel and specific performance require a valid enforceable contract.

Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005); citing

Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 (1981);
Bcnrchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 91, 233 P.3d 18, 22
(2008); Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. CrandlemJre, 140 Idaho 276, 285, 92
P.3d 526, 535 (2004); citing Garner v. Barschi, 139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036
(2003). Promissory estoppel and specific performance cannot be applied to enforce a
contract that is otherwise unenforceable based on the statute of frauds.

Id.

For the reasons set forth above, the Agreements are unenforceable based upon the
statute of frauds. No genuine issue of material fact exist, plaintiffs' claims for promissory

estoppel and specific performance fail as a matter of law. CDA Placer is entitled to
suinm.:ny judgment on plaintiffs' claims for promissory estoppel and specific performance.

ffi.

CDA PLACER AND IFG ARE ENTITLED TO SUM1\1ARY JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFF'S' CLATh1 FOR UNJUST ENRICHIVIENT.
The plain riffs' unjust enrichment claim is based upon the assertion that the plaintiffs

confened a benefit upon CDA Placer and IFG because they improved and maintained the
Property and because they cannot remove the Buildings without rendering them ' 1valueless."

Complaint, i1~ 6.1-6. 7.

251

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY J1JDGMENT - 4

l'I

.

v,

V f

1V

I ,

.)/

The equitable remedy of unjust enrichment cannot apply when an adequate remedy at

.

law exists based on

an express agreement. Thomas v. Thomas,

ISO Idaho 63.6, 642, 249 P.3d

829, 835 (2011). "Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express
contract covering the same subject matter." Id.
Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at lav.r. The Land Lease was a valid contract
between CDA Placer and the plaintiffs and as set forth above, dictates the rights and
obligations of the parties relevant to residing on the Property and maintaining or improving
the Property. Aff T. De Smet in Supp. MSJ., Ex. C. The Land Lease provides plaintiffs with
an adequate remedy at la\v and plaintiffs' equitable claim for unjust emichment foils as a matter
of law.
''Unjust enrichment [also] requires "(1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable fot the
defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit." Teron Peaks, Inv.

Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 195 P.3d 1207 (2008).
Plaintiffs' unjust emichment claim also fails because plaintiffs have not conferred a
benefit on CDA Placer or IFG that would be inequitable to retain. As set fo11h above, the Land
Lease provides for the rights and obligation of the parties relevant to residing on the Property
and maintaining or improving the Property. These were rights and obligations agreed to by
CDA Placer and the plaintiffs. If CDA Placer received a benefit, the benefit is born from the
Land Lease-not an outside benefit bestowed by the plaintiffs. CDA Placer is entitled to any
benefits flowing from the Land Lease; this includes the right ro retain ownership of any
improvements. This was the benefit of the bargain under the Land Lease. No evidence exists
on this record of a benefit that was conferred on CDA Placer or IFG that would be inequitable
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for either to retain. No genuine issue of material fact exists on this record and plaintiffs' claim

.

.

for unjust emichmerit fails as a matter of law. CDA Placer and IFG a.re entitled to summary
judgment.

\VHEREFORE:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is granted.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED} plaintiffa'
claims against defendant, CDA Placer for breach of contract, prnmisso1y estoppe1, specific
performance, and urtjust enrichment are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, plaintiffs'
claim against defendant, IFG for unjust enrichment is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, defendants
CDA Placer and IFG are the prevailing party, as to the first party complaint.
This Court reserves and does not enter judgment on IFG's counterclaim against
plaintiffs for Ejectment and Damages.
DATED this

tl+, day of April, 2015.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tlfy that on the~ day of April, 2015, I served a true a11d correcr copy ofrbe
foregoing by the method indicated belowi and addressed to the following:

James Mcl\1illan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Streeti Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

US Mail

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 752~1900

*

Theron J. De Smet
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
700 Northwest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

US Mail

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 664-5884

+

~ ~1 oshon.t- Co. ,Dis+ C~~

+0-1-d-

CLERK OF THE DISTIUCT COURT

ByD~e~1

254
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION fOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT~ 7

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184

201SHAY.26 PM J: 30

Attorneys for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-375

.,

.,

COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER,
LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.
Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC moves this court pursuant to LR. C.P. 56(b) for its order
granting it summary judgment on its counterclaim against plaintiff. This motion is based on
Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Affidavit of Michael Branstetter filed contemporaneously herewith, and Affidavit of
Theron J. De Smet in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 6,
2015.

-zncl

DATED this ~day of May, 2015.

255
COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

. De Smet, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Coeur d'Alene Placer
Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22day of May, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ ~ d Delivered
_t,/F_ac~simile (208) 752-1900
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184
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Attorneys for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-375
COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER,
LLC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.
Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC ("IFG") submits its Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION

In 1995, William and Joan Nicholson (the "Nicholsons") entered into a Land Lease to
lease a parcel of property ("Property") owned by Coeur d'Alene, Placer Mining Corp. ("CDA
Placer"). The Nicholsons renewed the Land Lease annually through 2014. The Nicholsons
paid $2,250 to rent the Property from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.
In January 2014, CDA Placer gave the Nicholsons a written notice of termination of
'9 r:; I "
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the Land Lease and later sold the Property to IFG. The Land Lease expired or was terminated
on June 30, 2014. The Nicholsons did not vacate the Property and remain in possession.
IFG has asserted counterclaims against the Nicholsons for damages and a writ of
ejectment. The Nicholsons have no legal or equitable right to possession of the Property and
IFG is entitled to restitution of the Property and a writ of ejectment, if necessary. IFG is also
entitled to the fair market rental rate of the property for the period of the Nicholsons' unlawful
possession of the Property as damages.
No genuine issue of material fact exists. IFG is entitled to summary judgment on its
counterclaims against the Nicholsons.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

1.

On August 28, 1995, the Nicholsons entered into a Land Lease with CDA Placer

to lease the Property for a period commencing July 1, 1995 through June 30. 1996. A.ff. T. De
Smet, Ex. B. The Nicholsons renewed the Land Lease annually and continued to do so until June

30, 2014. A.ff. T. De Smet, Ex. C.; Answer CDA Placer,
2.

,r 8.

On August 7, 2013, the Nicholsons renewed the Land Lease and paid an annual

rent of $2,250 for the lease period of July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. Counterclaim,
Answer to Counterclaim,

3.

,r 8, Ex. E;

,r 2. 8.

On January 28, 2014, CDA Placer, through counsel, Michael K. Branstetter,

sent "NOTICE OF TERMINATION" of the Land Lease to the Nicholsons' counsel.
Counterclaim,

,r 11,

Ex. G; A.ff. M Branstetter,

,r Ex. A; Answer to Counterclaim, ,r 2.11.

The

"NOTICE OF TERMINATION" provided as follows:
"CDAP hereby provides NOTICE OF TERMINATION of any land lease which
may be in existence between you and CDAP. Your tenancy or occupancy will end
q r: n
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on June 30, 2014. Your rent payments are current through that date.
Please vacate the property by midnight on June 30, 2014 and have all your personal
property removed by that date ... "
Id.

4.

On March 6, 2014, the Nicholsons' counsel wrote to Michael K. Branstetter

acknowledging receipt ofCDA Placer's "NOTICE OF TERMINATION" ofJanuary 28, 2014.
A.ff. M Branstetter, ,i l,· Ex. B; Counterclaim, Ex. H,· Answer to Counterclaim, ,i 2.12.

5.

On March 18, 2014, CDAPlacer, through counsel, Michael K. Branstetter wrote

to the Nicholsons' attorney, and, again notified the Nicholsons of their obligation to vacate the
Property at the expiration of the lease on June 30, 2014, stating: "Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson have
been afforded ample time to vacate the property and if a proceeding to cause their removal is
necessary, I am sure my client will seek and be entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to
Idaho Code, Section 6-324." A.ff. M Branstetter, ,i 3,· Ex. B,· Counterclaim, Ex. L" Answer to
Counterclaim,

6.

,r 2.13.
On March 28, 2014, IFG purchased the Property (described in Exhibit A to IFG

Answer/Counterclaim) from CDA Placer. Counterclaim,

,r 2; Answer to

Counterclaim,

,r,r

2.1; 2.2. IFG has been the fee simple owner of the Property since March 28, 2014. Id.

7.

The

Land

Answer/Counterclaim IFG,
8.

Lease

expired

or

was

terminated

on

June

30,

2014.

,r 17.

Since July 1, 2014, no rental agreement has existed which entitles the Nicholsons

to possession of the Property. Id.; A.ff. T De Smet, Ex. A; (RFA No. 25,· Interrogatory. No. 15).
9.

The Nicholsons have not paid rent for the Property since their lease expired on

June 30, 2014 or otherwise compensated IFG for retaining possession of the Property. A.ff. T De
COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER, LLC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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Smet, Ex. A (RFA No. 24; Interrogatory No. 15).

10.

The Nicholsons have been in possession of the Property since July 1, 2014 and

remain in possession. Counterclaim, ,i,i 17, 18.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

If a motion for summary judgment is supported by a particularized affidavit, the
opposing party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings,"
but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of fact. 1.R.C.P. 56 (e); Verbillis v.
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct.App. 1984). Summary

judgments are to be decided on facts actually shown in the record. Id.; Lind v. Perkins, 107
Idaho 901, 903, 693 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App. 1984). A court will not hypothecate facts to
forestall a summary judgment. Eimco Div., Environtech v. United Pacific, 109 Idaho 762, 764,
710 P .2d 672, 674 ( 1985). Further, it is well settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a
slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark
Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).

The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. When there are no genuine
issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a trial court is justified
in denying a trial on the merits. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 340, 563 P.2d 395 (1977).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.

The Nicholsons are Guilty of Unlawful Detainer of the Property as a Matter
of Law.

The evidence of record in undisputed. IFG is the fee simple owner of the Property and
the Nicholsons have no legal or equitable right to possession-yet they remain in possession.
IFG is entitled to possession as a matter of law.
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The Nicholsons entered the Property pursuant to the Land Lease. On August 7, 2013,
the Nicnolsons ren~wed the Land Lease for the period of July 1, 2013 t; June 30, 2014. On
March 28, 2014, the Nicholsons were given "NOTICE OF TERMINATION" informing them
that the Land Lease would not be renewed and the Land Lease would expire or terminate on June
30, 2014. The Nicholson acknowledged receipt of the "NOTICE OF TERMINATION." The
Nicholsons' Land Lease expired or was terminated on June 30, 2014; however, the Nicholsons
remain in possession.
As a matter of law, the Nicholsons have no legal or equitable right to possession of the
Property. IFG is entitled to restitution of the Property and, if necessary, a writ of ejectment
directing the Sheriff to remove the Nicholsons and their personal effects from the Property.
Il.

IFG is Entitled to Damages in the Form of the Fair Market Rental Value of
the Property.

The Nicholsons have unlawfully remained in possession of the Property from July 1,
2014 to present (357 days as of June 22, 2015). The Nicholsons have not paid any rent for this
period of time. IFG is entitled to the fair market value of rent for this period.
The fair market value of rent is not reasonably disputable; it is, at least, the annual rental
rate paid by the Nicholsons for the previous annual rental period-$2,250. Therefore, IFG is
entitled to $6.16 per day for the period of time the Nicholsons have unlawfully remained in
possession of the Property. 1 The Court should grant summary judgment awarding IFG
damages in an amount equal to the number of days the Nicholson have unlawfully possessed
the Property multiplied by the daily fair market rental rate.

1

Calculated as follows: annual rent $2,250/365 day year=$6.16/per day.
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CONCLUSION

'No genuine issue of material fact exists. As a matter of law, the Nicholsons have
unlawfully possessed IFG's Property for nearly a year. IFG is entitled to summary judgment
on its Counterclaim. This Court should enter an order granting IFG restitution of the Property
and the fair market rental rate for the period of the Nicholsons' wrongful possession as
damages.
DATED this t,/,day of May, 2015.

. e
et, Of the Firm
Atto eys for Coeur d'Alene Placer
Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC

CERTJFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the i.t.c:lay of May, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

US Mail
Overnight Mail
_ ijand Delivered
Jfacsimile (208) 752-1900
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RAi\1SDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184
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Attorneys for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp. and IFG Timber, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,

Case No. CV-2014-375
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL
BRANSTETTER IN SUPPORT OF
COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER,
LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Shoshone )
Michael Branstetter, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney for defendant, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp. ("CDA

Placer'}

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this affidavit and I am

competent to testify to the matters herein.
2.

I submit this Affidavit in support of Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary

263

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL BRANSTETTER IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG
TIMBER, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

Ma~ 20 2015

10: 52AM
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1
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Judgment.

3.

On January 28, 2014, on behalf of CDA Placer, I sent a "NOTICE OF

TERMINATION" of Land Lease to William and Joan Nicholsons• counsel. A true and correct
copy of the "NOTICE OF TERMINATION" is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
On March 18, 2014, on behalfofCDAPlacer, I sent a letter to William and Joan

4.

Nicholsonsi coWJ.sel. A true and correct copy offue March 18, 2014 letter is attached hereto

as Exhibit B.

FURTHER YOURAFFIANTSAYET~~ ~-:::::::'1:1:a-:.---!viichael Branstetter

·

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before methisao~day of May 2015.

.U .

~Ctttd \
~l'!Yf'k:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Dsb.Ko, ]A~~

My commission expires:S/IS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the&avday of May, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

James McMillan
Attorney at Law

41 S Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873

US Mail
__ Ovemight Mail
Hand Delivered
i,/

Facsimile (208) 752-1900
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EXHIBIT A

M1CHAEL K. BRANSTETTER

HULL & BRANSTETTER

CHARTERED
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
416 RIVER STREET
P.O. BOX 709
WALLACE, ID 83873-0709

H.J. HULL (1888-1975)
ALDEN HULL (1919-1984)
PIATT HULL (1914-1992)
TELEPHONE: (208) 752-1154
FAX: (208) 752-0951

January 28, 2014
Michael and Joan Nicholson
2867 Prichard Creek Road
Wallace, ID 83873

Re:

Certified Mail/Return Receipt
Requested
7009 0820 0001 7349 9379

Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company Land Lease
Eagie, Idaho

NOTICE OF TERMINATION
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson:
This office represents Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company ("CDAP")
and we have been instructed to notify you of the following.
CDAP hereby provides NOTICE OF TERMINATION of any land lease
which may be in existence between you and CDAP. Your tenancy or occupancy
will end on June 30, 2014. Your rent payments are current tlu·ough that date.
Please vacate the property by midnight on June 30, 2014 and have all your
personal property removed by that date. Further, please leave the real prope1ty in a
clean and safe condition. CDAP will have the property inspected on July 1, 2014.

If you have any question please contact me.
Very truly yours,

MKB/pwk
Cc: CDAP
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MICHAEL K. BRANSTETTER

HULL & BRANSTETTER
CHARTERED
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
416 RJVtR STREET
P.O. BOX 709
WALL~CE, ID 83873-0709

. H.J. HULL (1888-1975)
ALDEN HULL (1919-1984)
PIA TT HULL (1914-1992)
TELEPHONE: (208) 752-1154
FAX: (208) 752-0951

March 18, 2014
James McMillan, Esq.
Attorney at Law, P.L.L.C.
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, ID 83873
Re:

Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company - Nicholson
Lease

Dear James:
I have forwarded your letter dated March 6, 2014 on to Coeur d'Alene
Placer Mining Company and am awaiting instructions.
In the meantime, however, please send me a copy of the right of first refusal.
I am not aware that one exists.
Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson have been afforded ample time to vacate the
property and if a proceeding to cause their removal is necessary, I am sure my
client will seek and be entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code,
Section 6-324.
I do not know if my client has any further interest in discussing a sale, but
based on other sales to existing tenants, I am fairly confident there is no interest in
the purchase price you suggest.
Very truly yours,

HULL & BRANSTETTER CHARTRED

By:~~
Michael K. Branstetter
Cc: client
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BY

JAMES McMILLAN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900
ISB # 7523
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,
vs.

Case No.

CV-14-375

OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANT
IFG TIMBER, L.L.C.'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants and Counter-claimant

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W.

MICHAEL NICHOLSON and

JOAN NICHOLSON (hereinafter "Counter-

defendants"), by and through their Counsel of Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law,
and hereby OBJECTS to Counterclaimant IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment
as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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The facts from Plaintiffs' standpoint are sufficiently set forth in the Verified Complaint on
file herein, Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Plaintiffs'
Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, also on file herein.
In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Defendants are "entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record
in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor
of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991)
(emphasis added).
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an]
issue for trial [ifJ there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) (emphasis
added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit, construing the Federal rule
upon which the Idaho rule is modeled, further explained the term "genuine" as being
"sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor either side."
National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1995). In the same case, it
further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation
under the applicable law." Id. Further, "a motion for summary judgment must be denied if the
evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might
reach different conclusions." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650
P.2d 657,661 (1982).
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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As such, for the following reasons, Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment
should be DENIED, and Plaintiffs' claims should be allowed to proceed to trial on this matter.

II.

ARGUMENT

Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment essentially relies upon the Notice of
Termination which was sent to Counterdefendants by Coeur d'Alene Placer's then-counsel,
Michael Branstetter, on or about January 28, 2014 (erroneously stated to be March 28 in
Counterclaimants' Memorandum in Support of the instant Motion, Page 5). Counterdefendants
did, indeed, acknowledge receipt of the same and offer the purchase the property.

See

Complaint, Exhibit A, on file herein. However, in response, while noting the Termination, Mr.
Branstetter stated that he had "forwarded [the] letter ... on to Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company and [was] awaiting instructions." Affidavit of Michael Branstetter, Exhibit B. Mr.
Branstetter further states that he did "not know if [his] client [Coeur d'alene Placer] [had] any
further interest in discussing a sale," and then went on to say that he felt that they were unlikely
to be interested in the price offered by Counterdefendants. Id. However, he did not state that
Coeur d'Alene Placer was, in fact, not interested in selling to Counterdefendants, nor did he rule
out the possibility of a counteroffer. Further, then-counsel for Coeur d'Alene Placer did not state
that there was a pending sale to Counterclaimant IFG. As such, a reasonable conclusion to be
drawn by Counterdefendants was that there remained a possibility that a sale was possible, albeit
at a different price than offered by Counterdefendants.
After hearing no further word of Coeur d'Alene Placer's "further instructions" to its thencounsel, nor any counteroffer to Counterdefendants' offer, Counterdefendants' counsel wrote a
follow-up letter to Mr. Branstetter on or about March 31, 2014.

See Affidavit of James

McMillan, Exhibit B. Again, significant time passed, with no confirmation that the sale to IFG
had taken place, which led Counsel to write a further follow-up letter, dated April 30, 2014.
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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Eventually, Counsel learned that the property had been sold to Counterclaimant, despite Coeur
d'Alene Placer's failure to inform Counterdefendants of its rejection of their offer.
As such, the failure of Coeur d'Alene Placer to inform Counterdefendants of the pending
sale prior to it having taken place, and failure to reject Counterdefendants' offer, induced
Counterdefendants to remain on the Property in the hope that a sale of either the buildings or
property, as Counterdefendants were led to believe would occur at the end of the leasehold
relationship, would in fact occur. See Complaint, 1 2.5. In other words, the evidence on record
herein could lead a rational trier of fact to determine that Coeur d'Alene Placer's representations
that "further instructions" with regard to the Nicholson's offer were forthcoming, and their
concealment of the pending sale to Counterclaimant, constituted a false representation and/or
concealment of a material fact, of which (as a party to said sale) Coeur d'Alene Placer had
knowledge and of which the Nicholsons did not, which was made with the intention that the
Nicholsons would rely upon the same, and upon which they did, in fact, rely. See JR. Simplot
Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 113, 350 P.2d 211, 216 (1960) (outlining the elements of

Equitable Estoppel). Further, as the lessor's assignee, the remedies available to the Nicholsons as
against Coeur d'Alene Placer are likewise available as against IFG Timber, and, further, nowhere
in IFG's Counterclaim is it alleged that they lacked knowledge of the relationship between the
Nicholsons and Coeur d'Alene Placer.
Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not IFG Timber's
Counterclaim is barred by the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. As such, viewing the allegations in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Defendants have failed to establish that they are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and their Motion for Summary Judgment should be
denied.

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
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III.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be DENIED.

DATED this 9tl1 day of June, 2015.
JAMES McMILLAN,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. Desmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants
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U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_K_ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884
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JAMES McMILLAN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900
ISB # 7523
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Case No.

CV-14-375

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMILLAN

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,
vs.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants and Counter-claimant

JAMES MCMILLAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) years, and I am competent to testify to the facts

2.

I am the counsel of record for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and thus

herein;

have personal knowledge of the facts to which I am testifying;
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of correspondence from

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMILLAN - I

myself to then-counsel for Coeur d'Alene Placer Michael Branstetter, dated March 31, 2014, in
response to the letter attached to the Affidavit of Michael Branstetter as Exhibit B.
4.

After receiving no response to the same, I then drafted a follow up letter, dated

April 30, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit B (in the interim, I had reviewed the Shoshone County

Records, and noted a sale of several large tracts of land from Coeur d'Alene Placer to IFG
Timber). After significant time had passed, I telephoned Mr. Branstetter, and was informed over
the telephone that the property had been sold to Idaho Forest Group. I then drafted a letter to
Idaho Forest Group, dated June 10, 2014, which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Further your Affiant sayeth naught.
() /1..

DATED this-=t- day of June, 2015.

~LLAN
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this

Q day of June, 2015.
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Notary Public for the State ofl~p0BL1cFOR
TttE STATE OF 1tWiO
)
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KAREY ARTHUR
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. DeSmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants
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U.S. Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

James McMillan, Esq.
Attorney at Law, P.L.L.C
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone (208) 752-1800
Facs1m1le (208) 7 52-1900
Electromc Mau: mcmillanlaw@suddenlinkma1l.com

VIA FACSIMILE TO: (208) 752-0951

March 31, 2014
Michael K. Branstetter
Hull & Branstetter, Chtd.
416 River Street
P.O. Box 709
Wallace, Idaho 83873-0709

Re:

Nicholson-Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Co. Lease

Dear Mike:
Thank you for your response. We look forward to hearing Coeur d'Alene
Placer's response once you hear back from them.
Would you be able to tell us for how much the other parcels have been
selling to the other tenants?
Also 1 the Nicholsons would still like to know what, if any, roles Kevin
Boling, Bob Boyd, and/or Hank Odegard have with Coeur d'Alene Placer, as
each of these parties have made representations in the past that they speak
for the corporation to some degree, which has created some confusion since
the cessation of direct communications between the Nicholsons and the
Gardner Family. Additionally, Mr. Nicholson would also like to know what, if
any, position, role, or capacity a man named Daniel Frigard has with Coeur
d'Alene Placer.
Finally, Mr. Nicholson has heard that all or part of the land at issue has
been sold to Idaho Forest Group. First, is this true, and, if so, did the sale
include the land which the Nicholsons are leasing and occupying (in which
case, I would presume that further negotiations would need to be directed to
Idaho Forest Group)? I look forward to a prompt response.
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James McMillan, Esq.
Attorney at Law: P.L.L.C
415 Seventh Street, Sune 7
\.Vallace. Idaho 8387 3
Telephone 1208) i52-1800
FacslnH,e 2081 752-1900
Electronic Yla1l mcm1llanlaw@suddenirnkmailcom

VIA FACSIMILE TO: (Z08J 752-()951
April 30, 2014
Micha.el K. Branstetter
Hull & Branstetter, Chtd.

416 River Street
P.O. Box 709
Wallace, Idaho 83873-0709

Re:

Nicholson-Coeur d'Alene Plaeer Mining Co. Lease

Dear Mike:

I am just following up on my last response to your letter. We are still
awaiting answers to the following questions:
l.
What, if any, connections do Boling, Boyd, Odegard, and Frigard
have with Coeur d'Alene Placer?

Are you able to tell us for how much the other parcels sold to the
other tenants who have purchased from Coeur d'Alene Placer?
2.

3.
I note that, on March 28, Idaho Forest Group ( "IDFGn) purchased
a number of parcels from Coeur d'Alene Placer. Does this include the :and
the Nicholsons are leasing and, if so, could you direct me tc an appropr~ate
contact person from IDFG to whom to direct future comm nications regarding
the property at issue?
1
....

We would ask for a response within seven days of your receipt of this
letter 1 and look forward to hearing back from you.
Yours truly,

~~
1ames McMillan

XHIBIT 8
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James McMillan, Esq.
-.\ttorney at Law, P.L.L.C
· 415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
\\·allace, Idaho 83873
Telephone (208) 752-1800
Facsimile (208) 752-1900
Electroruc Mail: mcmillanlaw@suddenlrnkmad.com

June 10, 2014
Idaho Forest Group
687 Canfield Ave., Suite 100
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

Re:

Nicholson-Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Co. Lease
Z867 Prichard Creek Road - old Eagle City site

To Whom it May Concern:

I arr: writing on behalf of W. Michael and Joan Nicholson, who are
currently leasing the above-referenced property. Since 1995, they had been
leasing from Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company, and I had attempted to
correspond with Coeur d'Alene Placer's counsel, Mike Branstetter, with regard
to a termination of lease that was sent to the Nicholsons in late January. In
my correspondence, I relayed an offer by the Nicholsons to purchase the
property, and inquired as to the positions of various individuals who, at some
}X)int, had claimed some sort of connection to Coeur d'Alene Placer.

However, I did not receive any response to my second and third letters
to Mr. Branstetter, and, upon telephoning him, learned that the property at
issue had been sold to your company. As such, I am contacting you. Initially,
I would ask if you could confirm your purchase of the Nicholson parcel, and,
second, if you could respond to the Nicholson's offer and any of the issues we
raise in the enclosed correspondence to Coeur d'Alene Placer of which you
have knowledge?

Given the time frames involved, and delay in response from Coeur
d'Alene Placer, would ask for a reply as soon as possible. I hope to hear back
from you soon.

Yours truly,

XHIBIT

C

,....:J;----

~illan
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Description

Date 6/22/201

Location

1K-COURTROOM8

Note

Tim
04:32:58 PM

Calls case - Motion for Summary Judgment against the
counterclaiment. Reviews documents read in preparation for this
motion.

J
04:35:04 PM

My client owns property and Nicholsens have no right to be
Mr. Desmet there. Restitution back to my client. Award damages for as long
as Nicholsons have been illegally on property.

04:36:07 PM

In the counterclaim, not much of a legal description of the
property. Reviews exhibit A. Lease makes reference to a half
acre - insufficient. Cites 2 cases. We didn't raise this in our brief.
Reviewing pleadings again noted the problem with legal
description. Only legal description in countercaim is insufficient.
Hendrick vs Lee. ICRP 9U). Other than that, nothing to add
beyond that.

Mr.
Mclelland

Estople?
Mr. Brandstetter didn't outright reject the offer.
Case that says that this was Estople?
====

t been able to find any case?

04:41 :24
04:41 :38 PM

Mr.
Mclelland

That is an issue of fact whether given Mr. Brandstetter's
statement and my client's actions. We never received any
response or confirmation of offer.

J

Brandstetter set forth his client's initial offer - how do you get
promissory estople. Period of time where CDA Placer may not
have opportunity to accept or reject offer.

04:42:34 PM

04:44:52 PM

Even if this could qualify as promissory estople - we are here for
a completely legal entity. CDA Placer already terminated lease
Mr. Desmet
agreement. Ask that Motion for summary judgment be granted
and other issues are not properly here before the court.

j I will take this under advisement.

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, ET AL., )
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
)
)

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP.,)
a Delaware Corp., and IFG TIMBER, LLC, )
an Idaho Limited Liab. Co.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)

Case No.Shoshone CV 2014 375

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/
COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER,
LLC's MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

______________

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This matter is before the Court on the defendanU"Counterclaimant IFG Timber
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment" filed May 26, 2015.
This case arises out of a dispute over real property located at 2867 Prichard
Creek Road, Wallace, Shoshone County, Idaho (hereinafter "The Property").
-·
Complaint, p. 21J 2.2. In August 1995, the plaintiffs William and Joan Nicholson

(hereinafter "the Nicholsons"), purchased several buildings from Francis Gitter. Id., p. 2

1f 2.1. The buildings are located on the Property, which until March 2014 was owned
by the defendant Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corporation (hereinafter "Coeur d'Alene
Placer Mining"). Upon purchasing the buildings, the Nicholsons entered into a yearly
lease agreement with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining. Id. p. 2 ,I 2.3; Answer of IFG
Timber LLC and Counterclaim, p. 7 ~ 3. The lease was renewed by the Nicholsons and
Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining annually between 1995 and 2014. Complaint, p. 2

,m 2.1

t)
:..,,
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2.3. On January 28, 2014, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining notified the Nicholsons in
writing that their lease agreement with Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining would terminate on
June 30, 2014. Affidavit of Michael Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's Motion
for Summary Judgment, Exh. A. Specifically the notice, entitled "Notice of
Termination", provides in pertinent part:
NOTICE OF TERMINATION
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson:
This office represents Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company
("CDAP") and we have been instructed to notify you of the following.
CDAP hereby provides NOTICE OF TERMINATION of any land
lease which may be in existence between you and CDAP. Your tenancy
or occupancy will end on June 30, 2014. Your rent payments are current
through that date.
Please vacate the property by midnight on June 30, 2014 and have
all your personal property removed by that date. Further please leave the
real property in a clean and safe condition. CDAP will have the property
inspected on July 2, 2014.
Id. (emphasis in original).

On March 6, 2014, the Nicholsons responded to the "Notice of Termination" by
making an offer to purchase the Property. Complaint, p. 51J 2.20; Affidavit of Michael
Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B.
On March 18, 2014, counsel for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining sent counsel for the
Nicholsons a letter in response. Affidavit of Michael Branstetter in Support of IFG
Timber, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B. It provides in relevant part:
I have forwarded your letter dated March 6, 2014 on to Coeur
d'Alene Placer Mining Company and am awaiting instructions.

***
Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson have been afforded ample time to vacate
the property and if a proceeding to cause their removal is necessary, I am
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sure my client will seek and be entitled to attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 6-324.
I do not know if my client has any further interest in discussing a
sale, but based on other sales to existing tenants, I am fairly confident
there is no interest in the purchase price you suggest.
Id. (underline in original).

On March 28, 2014, the defendant IFG Timber, LLC (hereinafter "IFG Timber")
purchased the Property from Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining. Answer of IFG Timber LLC
and Counterclaim, p. 7112. IFG Timber did not enter into a lease agreement with the
Nicholsons. Id., p. 10 ,r 17. Despite this, the Nicholsons have remained on the
Property. Id. On June 30, 2014, without any basis in fact or in law, the Nicholsons
remained on the property and filed their Complaint in this action.
On March 24, 2015, at the conclusion of oral argument, this Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining against the Nicholsons on
the Nicholsons' claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppal, specific performance
and unjust enrichment, and in favor of IFG Timber against the Nicholsons on the
Nicholsons' claim of unjust enrichment. An "Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment" was entered on April 6, 2015.
On May 26, 2015, IFG Timber filed "Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Motion
for Summary Judgment". It is supported by "Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" and the "Affidavit of
Michael Branstetter in Support of Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment". On June 9, 2015, the Nicholsons filed their "Objection and
Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimant IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment" and the "Affidavit of James McMillan". Oral argument on this
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, matter was held on June 22, 2015. For the reasons,set forth below, the Court grants
IFG Timber's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court ... demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Brewer v. Washington RSA

No. 8 Ltd. Parlnership, 145 Idaho 735, 738 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008) (quoting Bade/Iv.
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126,127 (1988) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The
burden of proof is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Rouse v. Household Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 70, 156 P.3d 569,
571 (2007) (citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997)).
"Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party," to provide specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. Kieberl v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007)
(citing Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)); Samuel v. Hepworth,

Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). In construing
the facts, the court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,410, 179 P.3d 1064,
1066 (2008). If reasonable people can reach different conclusions as to the facts, then

the motion must be denied. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402 (1979).
The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more than
speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue.

Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
(1996). The non-moving party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the
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pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. 1.R.C.P. 56(e); see Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224,
1227 (1994). "[IJf the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish
the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving
party." Porterv. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008) (citing
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006)).

Ill. ANALYSIS.
A. The Nicholsons are Guilty of Unlawful Detainer.

IFG Timber argues that as the fee simple owner of the Property, it is entitled to
possession as a matter of law. Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. IFG Timber notes that the lease
agreement between Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining and the Nicholsons expired on
June 30, 2014. Id., p. 5. IFG Timber contends that five months prior to the expiration
of the lease agreement, agents for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining sent a "Notice of
Termination" to the Nicholsons, notifying them that their tenancy or occupancy of the
Property would end on June 30, 2014. Id. Despite receipt of the "Notice of
Termination", IFG Timber asserts the Nicholsons remain on the Property. Id. IFG
Timber contends that "[a]s a matter of law, the Nicholsons have no legal or equitable
right to possession of the Property [and] IFG is entitled to restitution of the Property
and, if necessary a writ of ejectment .... " Id. IFG Timber does not direct the Court to
any law in support of its claims.
In response, the Nicholsons acknowledge receipt of the "Notice of Termination".
Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimant IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Nicholsons claim to have responded to the
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"Notice of Termination" on March 6, 2014, by making an offer to purchase the Property.
Complaint, p. 5 1J 2.20; Affidavit of Michael Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B. The Nicholsons concede that on March 18,
2014, counsel for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining wrote them a letter informing them
Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining was "unlikely to be interested in the price offered".
Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimant IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. However, Nicholsons argue that since the letter
also stated counsel for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining was "awaiting instructions" about
the Nicholson's March 6, 2014, offer to purchase the Property, the Nicholsons never
received notice of the pending sale of the Property to IFG Timber, and counsel for
Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining never ruled out the possibility of a counteroffer in his
written responses. As such, Nicholsons argue, "a reasonable conclusion to be drawn

by [the Nicholsons] was that there remained a possibility that a sale was possible, albeit
at a different price than offered by {the Nicholsons]." Id.
Moreover, the Nicholsons contend "the failure of Coeur d'Alene Placer to inform
{the Nicholsons] of the pending sale prior to it have taken place, and failure to reject
[the Nicholsons'] offer, induced [the Nicholsons] to remain on the Property in the hope
that a sale of either the buildings or property, as [the Nicholsons] were led to believe
would occur at the end of the leasehold relationship ... " Id., p. 4. The Nicholsons
contend Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining concealed the pending sale of the Property to
IFG Timber from the Nicholsons. Id. They claim that this concealment constituted a
false representation or concealment of a material fact, "which was made with the
intention that the Nicholsons would rely upon the same, and upon which they did, in
fact, rely. Id. As such, the Nicholsons contend IFG Timber's counterclaim, as an
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assignee of Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining, is barred by the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Id.
For many reasons, Nicholsons' argument is absurd.
First, Nicholsons' argument conflates two separate issues. Nicholsons conflate

the fact that they were told in writing in clear terms that they had to vacate the property
by June 30, 2014, with Nicholsons' offer to purchase the property. The offer itself was

absurd, as it was an offer to purchase the property for the $2,250.00 rent payments
they had already made that year. James McMillan, counsel for Nicholsons, wrote on
March 6, 2014, to Michael Branstetter:
However, given that it would be in the parties' best interest to avoid
litigation if at all possible, Mr. Nicholson would propose the following by
way of settlement: He will accept the acre surrounding his home as per
the survey, plus an additional acre to the north-northeast, in consideration
of the $2,250 already paid for this year's lease.
Complaint, Exhibit A. The offer is absurd because the offer on its face lacks
consideration. Essentially, Nicholsons' offer was, "you get to keep what we already
owed and paid in rent, and we get the land." An offer to pay what is already owed in
rent is not consideration for the purchase of property.

But more importantly, unless

the Nicholsons hollow offer was accepted before June 30, 2014, and the Nicholsons
miraculously came into ownership of the property before June 30, 2015, the Nicholsons
had no right to remain on the property after June 30, 2014. The eviction notice by
Coeur d'Alene Placer and the valueless "offer" made by Nicholsons are two entirely
separate issues.
Second, the doctrine of estoppel simply does not apply as between Nicholsons

and IFG Timber. In sending the Notice of Termination to Nicholsons, Attorney Michael
Branstetter only acted upon behalf of Coeur d'Alene Placer. Affidavit of Michael
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Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B.
Attorney Michael Branstetter had no authority to bind the subsequent owner of the
property, IFG Timber.
Third, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is "based on the concept that it would
be inequitable to allow a person to induce reliance by taking a certain position and,
thereafter, take an inconsistent position when it becomes advantageous to do so."

Regjovich v. First W Investments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 158, 997 P.2d 615,619 (2000)
(citing Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 472, 903 P.2d 61 (1995)). Four elements must be
proven to establish a claim for equitable estoppal:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) the party asserting estoppal did
not know or could not discover the truth, (3) the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, and (4) the
person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts
were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment
to his [or her] prejudice.

Id. (quoting Knudsen v. Agee, 128 Idaho 776,779,918 P.2d 1221, 1224 (1996) (citing
Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341,344 (1982))).
This Court specifically finds the Nlcholsons have not met a single element of equitable
estoppel. First, there is no "false representation" in Michael Branstetter's Notice of
Termination letter to Nicholsons. That uncontroverted fact renders the next three
elements impossible of being met.
In this case, the Nicholsons' reliance on the March 18, 2014, letter from counsel
for Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining to support Nicholsons' claim that they could remain on
the property is misguided. While it is true that the March 18, 2014, letter does provide,
"l have forwarded your fetter dated March 6, 2014 on to Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company and am awaiting instructions", it also goes on to state:
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Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson have been afforded ample time to vacate
the property and if a proceeding to cause their removal is necessary, I am
sure my client will seek and be entitled to attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 6-324.
I do not know if my client has any further interest in discussing a
sale, but based on other sales to existing tenants, I am fairly confident
there is no interest in the purchase price you suggest.
Affidavit of Michael Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exh. B (underline in original). Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Nicholsons, and finding that the "awaiting further instructions" language
in the March 18, 2014, letter could have led the Nicholsons to believe that they would
receive a counteroffer from Coeur d'Alene Placer for the purchase of the Property, the
fact remains that on June 30, 2014, the day they were instructed to vacate the Property
pursuant to the "Notice of Termination", they knew Coeur d'Alene Placer had sold the
Property to IFG Timber, and they knew there was no counteroffer from either Coeur
d'Alene Placer or IFG Timber to the Nicholsons. See Complaint. On June 30, 2014,
the date they were to vacate the Property, the Nicholsons instead chose to remain on
the property, no longer paying rent, and filed their Complaint suing QQ!h Coeur d'Alene
Placer Mining and IFG Timber. Complaint, pp. 1-91J1J 1.3, 1.4.
Moreover, there is no evidence before this Court that Coeur d'Alene Placer was
required to notify the Nicholsons of this sale. Even if this Court could construe any of
the evidence presented to find that Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining was required to notify
the Nicholsons of the sale to IFG Timber, and then concealed the sale from the
Nicholsons, somehow inducing the Nicholsons to believe they could remain on the
Property after June 30, 2014, the Nicholsons could still not prevail on a claim for
equitable estoppel. It is clear that the Nicholsons discovered the truth about the sale to
IFG Timber prior to the date they were to vacate their Property. Complaint, p. 4 il 2.17.
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"[O]ne may not assert estoppel based upon another's misrepresentation if the one
claiming estoppal had readily accessible means to discover the truth." Regjovich, 134
Idaho at 158, 997 P.2d at 619. The evidence before this Court is that on June 30,
2014, the day the Nicholsons were instructed to vacate the Property, they knew the
Property was sold to IFG Timber and, as such, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining would not
be making a counteroffer to the Nicholsons. The Nicholsons have failed to present this
Court with any evidence upon which they could reasonably rely upon to remain on the
Property after June 30, 2014.

Fourth, Nicholsons' claim of "Equitable Estoppel" appears now for the first time
in response to IFG Timber's Motion for Summary Judgment. Nowhere in their
Complaint do the Nicholsons make a claim of equitable estoppel. Instead, in their
Complaint, Nicholsons only make a claim of "Promissory Estoppal" based on a claimed
right of first refusal made by Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining. Complaint, p. 7, "Count II Promissory Estoppel",

ffll 4.1 - 4.7.

In their Complaint, Nicholsons mention Michael

Branstetter's January 28, 2014, Notice of Termination Letter, but make no claim of any
sort of "reliance" on that letter. Id., p. 5,

,m 2.20, 2.21.

This simply demonstrates that

Nicholsons' "equitable estoppel" claim is nothing more than a last gasp effort dreamt up
by their attorney without any basis in fact or in law.
The Court now turns to IFG Timber's claim for unlawful detainer. "When a
lessee holds over after his tenancy for a fixed term of years expires, the lessor must
elect to either treat the lessee as a trespasser or hold him to a new tenancy." Lewiston
Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 644-45, 718 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Ct.
App. 1985) (citing R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 2:23 (1980); 45 A.L.R.2d 827 (1956)). "If a lessor demands or accepts rent from the
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lessee, he will be presumed to have elected to hold the lessee to a new tenancy,
absent of course, a clearly expressed intention to the contrary." Id. at 645, 718 P.2d at

556 (citing Lonergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122, 357 A.2d 910
(1975)). However, if a lessor "treats the lessee as a trespasser, the lessor may bring
an action for unlawful detainer." Id. (citing I.C. § 6-303 et seq.). Unlawful detainer is

defined by Idaho Code § 6-303. It provides in relevant part that:
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:

1. When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property, or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is
let to him, without the permission of his landlord, or the successor in
estate of his landlord, if any there be; but in case of a tenancy at will, it
must first be terminated by notice, as prescribed in the civil code.
I.C. § 6-303(1).
In this case, the Nicholsons leased the Property from Coeur d'Alene Placer
Mining on a yearly basis, beginning in 1995 and ending on June 30, 2014. Answer of
IFG Timber LLC and Counterclaim, p. 7 ,r 3; Verification of Counterclaim; Complaint, p.
2

,m 2.1,

2.3. On January 28, 2014, Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining notified the

Nicholsons that their lease agreement would terminate on June 30, 2014. Affidavit of
Michael Branstetter in Support of IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exh. A IFG Timber purchased the Property from Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining
Company on March 28, 2014. Answer of IFG Timber LLC and Counterclaim, p. 71J 2;
Verification of Counterclaim. There is no evidence that the Nicholsons' lease
agreement was renewed by IFG Timber. Id., p. 101'J 17; Verification of Counterclaim.
In fact, IFG Timber specifically claims "[t]he plaintiffs' lease expired on June 30, 2014
and has not been renewed. The plaintiffs have unlawfully remained on the abovedescribed property without right or authority of law [and] have ousted IFG Timber LLC
MEMORANDUM DECISION ANO ORDER GRANTING OEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT JFG TIMBER, LLC's MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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from it." Id. There is no evidence that since June 30, 2014, the Nicholsons have made
any payments to IFG Timber or Coeur d'Alene Placer for lease of the property. As
such, new tenancy has not been created by operation of law.
This evidence shifts the burden to the Nicholsons to provide specific facts
demonstrating a genuine issue remains for trial. The Nicholsons have failed to refute
this evidence. As such, the Court finds the Nicholsons are guilty of an unlawful
detainer pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-303(1). Nicholsons' arguments to defend IFG
Timber's counterclaim of unlawful detainer are specious. Accordingly, the Court grants
IFG Timber's counterclaim for unlawful detainer, finding Nicholsons have unlawfully
remained on IFG Timber's property since June 30, 2014.
B. Nicholsons' New Claim at Oral Argument that the Property is not
Sufficiently Described.

At oral argument, counsel for the Nicholsons for the first time made the claim
that there is "not much of a legal description of the property." This argument was not
raised in Nicholsons' "Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimant
IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment."
In making the argument at oral argument, counsel for Nicholsons violated
I.R.C.P. 56(e) by making that argument without any admissible evidence, violated
I.R.C.P. 56(c) by not making the argument in their answering brief filed at least fourteen
days before hearing, violated I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) and likely violated I.R.C.P. 8(c) by not
being pied as an affirmative defense.
In making this argument, again for the first time, counsel for the Nicholsons cited
I.R.C.P. 90) and Hedrick v. Lee, 39 Idaho 42, 227 P. 27 (1924), apparently for its
holding that, 'The general rule is that a judgment involving the right to possession of
real property must sufficiently describe it to enable an officer charged with the duty of
MEMORANDUM DEC!SfON AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER, LLC's MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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executing a writ of possession to go.upon.the ground, and, without exercising judicial
functions, ascertain the locality of the lines as fixed by the judgment." 39 Idaho 42, _.
227 P. 27, 29. That case involved a dispute over a mining claim. The Idaho Supreme
Court held the property was not sufficiently described in the plaintiff's complaint, noting:
The complaint does not describe the claim by metes and bounds, nor set
forth the location notices. A demurrer was interposed, which appellant
claims should have been sustained because of the indefiniteness of the
description. However, we conclude that the reference in the complaint to
the location notices on file in the office of the county recorder saved it as
against the general demurrer. The description in the decree is still more
indefinite. It does not refer to the description in the complaint, but simply
says that the property is located in the Mineral Hill mining district in Blaine
county, Idaho, and is described as follows:
"The Grey Eagle No. 1, the Grey Eagle No. 2, the Grey Eagle No.
3, the Grey Eagle No. 4, mining claims."
39 Idaho 42, _. 227 P. 27, 29. In a dispute over a mining claim, the boundary of the
property would be essential. In the present case, Nicholsons allege: "The property in
dispute is located at 2867 Prichard Creek Road, at the site of the old Eagle City
settlement;" Complaint, p. 2, 1f 2.2. That is all that is needed for the Shoshone County
Sheriff to execute a writ of ejectment. That description provided by the Nichofsons in
their Complaint is certainly sufficient under I.R.C.P. 90), which requires "ln an action for
the recovery of real property, it must be described in the complaint with sufficient
certainty as to enable an officer, upon execution, to identify it."
C. Damages Awarded to IFG Timber Against Nicholsons.
<

As a result of the unlawful detainer, IFG Timber seeks an award of damages
from the Nicholsons for the time period they have remained on the Property, July 1,
2014, through the present. Counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. IFG Timber seeks an award based on
the fair market value of the rent for this period of time. Id. Using the annual lease
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price the Nicholsons paid Coeur d'Alene.Placer Mining under the 2013-2014 lease
agreement, $2,250.00, and dividing that amount by 365, IFG Timber seeks damages in
the amount of $6.16 per day. Id.; Answer of IFG Timber LLC and Counterclaim, p.

711

5; Verification of Counterclaim. The Nicholsons have provided no dispute of material
fact that this is not the appropriate measure of damages.
D. IFG Timber is Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-324.

Idaho Code § 6-324 provides: "In any action brought under the provision of this
chapter [Chapter 3, Idaho Code § 6-301 et.seq "Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer) ... the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees." The
Court finds the notice required under I.C. § 6-303 was given to Nicholsons in Michael
Branstetter's January 28, 2014, "Notice of Termination". Nicholsons were then
subsequently warned early on that attorney fees would be sought when, on March 18,
2014, Michael Branstetter wrote to James McMillan:
Mr. and Mrs Nicholson have been afforded ample time to vacate
the property and if a proceeding to cause their removal is necessary, I am
sure my client will seek and be entitled to attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-324.
Complaint, Exhibit A. In its Answer, IFG Timber seeks "costs of suit" and "... attorney
fees pursuant to the letter agreements executed by the plaintiffs and pursuant to Idaho
Code § 6-324;" Answer of IFG Timber, LLC and Counterclaim, p. 11, ,i ,I 3, 4. The
Court finds IFG Timber to be the prevailing party on its counterclaim and entitled to its
fees and costs against the Nicholsons.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim against Nicholsons for unlawful detainer,
ejectment and damages.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT IFG TIMBER, LLC's MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,counJerclairnant IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment on their counterclaim against Nicholsons for unlawful detainer and
ejectment is GRANTED. The Court will sign a writ of ejectment upon presentation by
counsel for IFG Timber.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment on their counterclaim against Nicholsons for damages for
unlawfully holding over are granted in the amount of $6.16 per day from July 1, 2014, to
the present day, and continuing until Nicholsons vacate the property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED couterclaimant IFG Timber, LLC is the prevailing
party as to its Counterclaims against Nicholsons, and as such, IFG Timber, LLC is
entitled to an award of its attorney fees under J.C.§ 6-324 incurred in prosecuting its
counterclaims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counsel for IFG Timber, LLC prepare a Judgment
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order.
Entered this 23rd day of June, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF
TIIB STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM1-0CHAELNICHOLSON,aka
W. MI:CHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-375

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
V.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
. Plaintiffs, WILLIAM M. NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON·s Complaint is

dismissed on the merits with prejudice.
Counterclaimant, IFG TIMBER, LLC, has prevailed on its Counterclaim and is hereby
entitled to and granted possession of the subject prope1ty, a writ of ejectrnent and awarded ·
damages in the amount of $6.16 per day from July 1, 2014 to the date of entry of this Judgment
and continuing until Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, the Nicholsons, have vacated the subject
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property, with interest thereon as provided by law from the date of entiy of this Judgment, until
satisfied in full.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,
vs.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,

CV-14-375

Case No.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ll(a)(2)(B) AND MOTION
TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 62(a)

Defendants and Counter-claimant

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their Counsel of Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully
move this Court for its Order RECONSIDERING its grant of Partial Summary Judgment to
Defendants and of Summary Judgment to Counterclaimant IFG. This Motion is supported by the
pleadings and records on file herein and Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support hereof, filed
~~
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contemporaneously herewith. Oral argument is requested on this Motion.
Plaintiffs further move this Court for its Order STAYING enforcement of the Judgment
entered herein pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a), pending the outcome of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, on the grounds that a stay will preserve the status quo
pending a decision on the Motion for Reconsideration, and avoid great hardship and expense to
Plaintiffs as a result of enforcement of the judgment, which would be unnecessary should this
Court choose to grant Reconsideration of its Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Counterclaimant IFG and reverse the same.
DATED this 2d day of July, 2015.
JAMES McMILLAN,
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
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Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,

CV-14-375

Case No.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

VS.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants and Counter-claimant

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON,
a/k/a W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their Counsel of Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully
submit their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, and hereby argues as
follows:

I.

INTRODUCTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
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The facts from Plaintiffs' standpoint are sufficiently set forth in the pleadings and records
submitted by Plaintiffs by way of their Complaint, Answer to Counter-claim, and Objections to
Defendants' respective Motions for Summary Judgment, on file herein. As such, for the sake of
brevity, Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.
"A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made
at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry
of final judgment."

Idaho R. Civ. P. 1l(a)(2)(B).

"When considering a motion for

reconsideration under Rule ll(a)(2), the district court should take into account any new facts,
law, or information presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the district
court's interlocutory oder. However, new evidence is not required and the moving party can reargue the same issues in addition to new arguments." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,
808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Johnson v.
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the case law in applying Rule

1l(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule,
but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence.").
As such, this Court is again called upon to consider the evidence on the record in light of
the applicable standard for Summary Judgment.

In ruling upon a Motion for Summary

Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any
material fact," and whether the Defendants are "entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Idaho
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to summary judgment require the district court .
. . to liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw
all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks,

119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) (emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an]
issue for trial [if] there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) (emphasis

added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit, construing the Federal rule
upon which the Idaho rule is modeled, further explained the term "genuine" as being
"sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational fact.finder to resolve the issue in favor either side."
National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1995). In the same case, it

further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation
under the applicable law." Id. Further, "a motion for summary judgment must be denied if the
evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might
reach different conclusions." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650
P.2d 657, 661 (1982). For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, this Court should RECONSIDER
its prior decisions granting Partial Summary Judgment to Defendants upon Plaintiffs' claims and
granting Summary Judgment upon Counter-claimant IFG Timber, L.L.C.'s (hereinafter "IFG")
Counter-claim, and DENY Summary Judgment on the same.

II.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs hereby re-assert their arguments made in briefing and at oral argument upon
Defendants' and Counter-claimant's respective Motions for Summary Judgment, and urge this
Court to consider the same in ruling upon this Motion. The remainder of this Memorandum will
focus upon addressing portions of the findings and conclusions set forth by the Court in its
Orders Granting Partial Summary Judgment and Summary Judgment to Defendants and upon
IFG's Counter-claim for which further argument may be instructive to the Court.

1.

Entry of Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Both Defendants ..

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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a.

Improvements to the Property as Reliance.
Initially, this Court held that Plaintiffs' improvements to the Property could not constitute

reasonable reliance so as to except the oral agreement from the Statute of Frauds, relying
primarily upon a provision in the lease stating that such consent to such improvements must be
made in writing. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter
"Order for Partial Summary Judgment") at 3. See also Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B (hereinafter "Lease"),~ 9. However, Defendants fail
to present evidence in opposition to Plaintiffs' assertion that the Gardners, as agents of Coeur
d'Alene Placer, personally viewed the improvements, and gave consent to the same.
Complaint,

~,r

2.9, 6.2;

See

Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit A (hereinafter "Plaitniffs' Discovery Responses"), pp. 9-10 (Answer to
Interrogatory No. 10). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that contractual provisions requiring a
that a waiver from contractual terms be in writing may, themselves, likewise be waived. See,

e.g., Lewis v. Continental Life and Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 355, 461 P.2d 243,250 (1969).
Therefore, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Gardners,
through their conduct, waived any potential claim on the part of Coeur d'Alene Placer that said
improvements were in contravention of the lease.

As such, Summary Judgment was not

appropriate on this finding, and this Court should grant reconsideration of the same.
b.

The Finding That the Option Was Exercised and Rejected.
Alternatively, this Court held that "as a matter of law, CDA placer did not not breach the

Agreements," and that the option was exercised and rejected.

Order for Partial Summary

Judgment at 3-4. However, the offer from Plaintiffs to Coeur d'Alene Placer was not made until

after, and in response to the Notice of Termination received from their then-counsel in early
2014. Complaint,~~ 2.20-2.21. In fact, the "rejection" was not communicated to Plaintiffs or
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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their counsel until after the sale to IFG had apparently taken place. Affidavit of James McMillan
in Opposition to Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment

,r,r

3-4. As such, to the

extend that the offer from Plaintiffs could be construed as an exercise of their option to purchase,
the sale to IFG prior to communicating the rejection of the same remains a breach of the
agreement. Therefore, again, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not
the Agreements were breached, and the Court should likewise grant reconsideration on these
grounds.
C.

Finding Regarding Ownership of Improvements and Buildings.
Finally, in granting Partial Summary Judgment, this Court found that the Lease "includes

the right to right to retain ownership of any improvements" and that such "was the benefit of the
bargain under the Land Lease." Order for Partial Summary Judgment at 5-6. It is unclear
whether this is a reference to the "improvements, alterations, or additions" referenced in
Paragraph 9 of the Lease, the provision regarding disposition of Plaintiffs' personal property and
buildings contained in Paragraph 18 of the Lease, or both. Of particular concern to Plaintiffs are
the buildings and disposition of the same, which is expressly discussed in Paragraph 18.
Paragraph 18 provides, in relevant part:
In the event of TENANT'S failure to remove any of TENANT'S property from
the Property, LANDLORD is hereby authorized, without liability to TENANT for
loss or damage thereto, at the sole risk of TENANT, to remove and store any such
property at TENANT'S expense, or to retain such property under LANDLORD'S
control, or to sell at public or private sale, without notice, any or all of the
property not so removed and to apply the net proceeds of such sale to the payment
of any sum due hereunder, or to destroy such property. Further, to secure
TENANT'S obligations under this Section 19, LANDLORD is hereby granted a
security interest in said property (including proceeds and after acquired property)
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Defendants do not produce any evidence contradicting Plaintiffs assertion that it would
be impossible to remove the buildings (which, in a preceding portion of the paragraph, are
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included within the same by definition), without destroying them. Therefore, this paragraph, by
its terms, (a) creates a lien on Plaintiffs' buildings; and (b) requires the forfeiture of the same
upon the expiration of the Lease if there is no renewal, with no opportunity to redeem the same.
Such a contract for forfeiture is expressly prohibited by statute. Idaho Code § 45-110
clearly states that "all contracts for the forfeiture of property subject to a lien, in satisfaction of
the obligation secured thereby, and all contracts in restraint of the right of redemption from a
lien, are void." Furthermore, "where the facts make the damage agreed to an unconscionable
penalty, equity will intercede to grant relief." Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 648, 570 P.2d
1334, 1338 (1977). Therefore, given the effect of the statute and the general equitable principle
against an unconscionable forfeiture, Defendants are not, as a matter of law, entitled to retain,
sell, or destroy the buildings without compensation to Plaintiffs for the same. As such, to the
extent that this Court relied upon this section in granting Partial Summary Judgment,
Reconsideration of such holding is warranted, and Plaintiffs urge this Court to grant the instant
Motion in that regard and deny Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' clams.
2.

Entry of Summary Judgment on IFG's Counterclaim.

a.

Finding of Unlawful Detainer.
Initially, this Court found that Plaitniffs/Counter-defendants were guilty of "unlawful

detainer." Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant/Counterclaimant IFG Timber
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order Granting IFG Summary Judgment") at
6. However, while Plaintiffs recognize that an allegation of a tenant holding over following the
expiration of a lease would fall within Idaho's Unlawful Detainer statute, Idaho Code§ 6-303(1),
IFG elected to counter-claim for common-law ejectment instead. See Answer of IFG Timber
LLC and Counterclaim at 7-11 (hereinafter "Counterclaim"). Further, even if the Counter-claim
could be deemed a claim for Unlawful Detainer, IFG's inclusion of a claim for damages within
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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the same was improper. Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 176,181,226 P. 736, 737 (1924) (holding that
an Unlawful Detainer action and a cause of action for money damages could not be joined in a
single suit). Therefore, Title 6, Chapter 3 of Idaho Code does not apply to IFG's Counterclaim,
and this Court should reconsider its decision granting Summary Judgment to the extent it relied
upon the same.

b.

Plaintiffs' Estoppel Claims.
This Court further found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs' Estoppel theory is inapplicable as

against IFG, and that the Estoppel claim was raised against IFG for the first time in response to
IFG's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Order Granting IFG Summary Judgment 8, 10. On the

first finding, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, when a successor-in-interest had notice of
the facts which would lead to an estoppel against its predecessor, the estoppel may be asserted
against the successor. Mikesell v. Newworld Development Corporation, 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840
P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ct. App. 1992) (applying the estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds against
the vendor's successor-in-interest).

Further, although Plaintiffs claims and defenses are not

brought pursuant to the Lease, a direct analogy can drawn to Idaho Code§ 55-303, which allows
a lessee the same remedies against a lessor's successor-in-interest with regard to a lease.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that IFG had knowledge of their oral agreement with Coeur
d'Alene Placer, Complaint 12.22, and that IFG would gain to benefit. Id. at 116.4-6.6. Viewing
these allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there arises a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether or not IFG was placed on sufficient notice in order to be likewise
estopped from bringing an action to remove the Nicholsons from the Subject Property.
Therefore, this Court should reconsider its grant of Summary Judgment on these grounds.
With regard to the finding that Plaintiffs raised the Estoppel argument against IFG for the
first time on summary judgment, Plaintiffs will call the Court's attention to their Second
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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Affirmative Defense raised in their Answer to IFG's Counterclaim:
Second Defense

Counter-claimant waived, or by its conduct, is barred in whole or in part
by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and consent from asserting the causes of
action contained in the Counter-claim.
Answer to Counterclaim, page 3. If the Court, by this finding, was implying that the Estoppel
defense was waived for failure to raise as an affirmative defense pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c), Plaintiffs' pleading of the same in their Answer to IF G's Counterclaim would
warrant a reconsideration of this finding, and denial of summary judgment on these grounds as
well.
C.

Sufficiency of Legal Description.
Finally, this Court ruled, essentially, that the issue of the legal description was not

properly brought before the Court, and that the description in Plaintiffs' Complaint was
sufficient.

Order Granting IFG Summary Judgment at 12-13. On its first finding, the Court

cites to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e), 56(c), 7(b)(3), and 8(c). However, in raising this
argument, Plaintiffs were not bringing any further new evidence before the Court (56(e)),
attempting to include it within written briefing in an untimely manner (56(c)), nor making a
written motion for dismissal (or otherwise) (7 (b )(3) (an inadequate legal description is not
enumerated as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c)). Rather, Plaintiffs were arguing that, due
to a facial deficiency in IFG's pleading on file herein, it was not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. However, even if this Court concludes that the argument was not properly raised
at that time, Plaintiffs urge this Court to consider this issue upon reconsideration, pursuant to the
holdings in theArregui and Johnson cases cited hereinabove.
IFG's Counterclaim cites to an attached exhibit for the legal description of the property
they are attempting to recover from Plaintiffs. Counterclaim,,, 1-3. The attached "Exhibit A"
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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contains two portions: A first page setting forth the "A.J. Prichard Mineral Survey 567 and
Combination Placer Mineral Survey 1762, Located at Section 35, Township 50 North, Range 4
East B.M. Shoshone County, Idaho", then a lengthy attachment, also entitled "Exhibit 'A',"
which seems to describe all of the land purchased from Coeur d'Alene Placer by IFG.
Counterclaim, Exhibit A. However, the Counterclaim does not set forth the portion of the A.J.
Prichard, Combination, or various sundry other claims that are subject to the lease, nor,
curiously, does it set forth the description contained on the face of the lease, the acreage of the
leasehold, or even the street address of the Property. Id. IFG simply alleges that Plaintiffs were
leasing "a portion" of the same. Counterclaim, ,i 3.
Following the grant of Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims, the allegations in
the Complaint were no longer before this Court; rather, the remaining issue was IFG's
counterclaim.

Moreover, a counterclaim, by its very nature, is a separate cause against the

Plaintiff in a case, rather than an addition to the Plaintiff's claim against a defendant. Further, not
only does IFG not incorporate Plaintiffs' description by reference, or otherwise plead it in its
counterclaim, but in their own Answer deny the adequacy of Plaintiffs' description. Answer of
IFG, ,i 7.
Therefore, based on IFG's allegations in its Counterclaim, even if accepted as true, it
essentially places in the discretion of the Sheriff which "portion" of the A.J. Prichard,
Combination, and/or other claims contained in the attachment, from which to eject the Plaintiffs.
IFG, at no point, sought to Amend its counterclaim following receipt of the Lease in the course
of Discovery, or otherwise took the opportunity to bring their Counterclaim in compliance with
Rule 9G). Thus, the Counterclaim, as presented to the Court, seeking the recovery of possession
of real property, is facially insufficient. As such, IFG was not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law thereon, and this Court should reconsider its grant of summary judgment on the same.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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III.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be
GRANTED, and Defendants'/Counterclaimant's .Motions for Summary Judgment should be
DENIED.
DATED this 2d day of July, 2015.
JAMES McMILLAN,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2d day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. DeSmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants
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JAMES McMILLAN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Telephone: (208) 752-1800
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900
ISB # 7523
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.
MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Case No.

CV-14-375

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants,
Fee Category: L.4
vs.

Fee: $129 -

/&-- ,

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants and Counter-claimant

TO:

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO AND TO
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE

AND TO:

Defendants Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Company and IFG Timber,
L.L.C. and their attorneys, Michael E. Ramsden and Theron J. DeSmet,
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, a/k/a W.

MICHAEL NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON, appeal against each and every one of the
above-named Respondents, COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING CORP., et al., to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 30 1h day of
June, 2015, by the Honorable Judge Mitchell, presiding;
2.

The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court Court, and the

Decision described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to I.A.R. 1l(a)(l);
3.

This appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact. The preliminary statement

of issues on appeal is as follows:
a.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Defendants

on Plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus
entitling them to a judgment as a matter of law with regard to Plaintiffs claims? In so
holding:
1.

Did the District Court err in holding that the improvements to the
Property could not constitute reasonable reliance so as to apply the
"estoppel" exception to the Statute of frauds?

11.

Based upon the evidence in the record, did the District Court err in
holding that Plaintiffs' option to purchase was exercised and
rejected?

111.

Did the District Court err in holding that Defendants have the right
to retain ownership of the buildings and improvements upon the

NOTICE OF APPEAL--2
F:\Clients\Nicholson, Mike\Notice of Appeal (2015 07 27--JMc).doc
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Property, without compenation to Plaintiffs for the same?
b.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment on Counter-

claimant IFG's Counter-claim for Ejectment, on the grounds that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, thus entitling it to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the
same? In so holding:
1.

Did the District Court err in applying Chapter 3, Title 6, Idaho
Code to IFG's Counter-claim, when said Counter-claim was
brought as a common-law Ejectment Claim;

11.

Alternatively, if Chapter 3, Title 6 does apply, did the District
Court err in entering judgment for monetary damages in the same
action as for possession of the Real Property?

111.

Did the District Court err in rejecting Counter-defendants' claim
that the Counter-claim lacked a sufficient legal description, and by
applying the description of the Property contained in Plaintiffs'
Complaint in entering judgment on the Counter-claim?

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the Record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested for the following hearings:
a.

Motion for Summary Judgment, March 24, 2015;

b.

Motion for Summary Judgment, June 22, 2015;

Said transcripts may be condensed.
6.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants further requests that the following documents be

included in the Clerk's record in addition to any automatically included pursuant to Rule 28,

I.AR.:
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a.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and all supporting Affidavits

and Memoranda;
b.

Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and all

supporting Affidavits and Memoranda;
c.

Counter-claimant IFG's Motion for Summary Judgment, and all supporting

Affidavits and Memoranda

b.

Plaintiffs' Objection to Counter-claimant IFG's Motion for Summary

Judgment and all supporting Affidavits and Memoranda;
c.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and all supporting Affidavits and

Memoranda; and
d.
7.

Any and all documents listed under Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(1 ).

I certify:
a.

That one original and two copies have been filed with the District Court;

b.

That a copy has been served upon the Court's court reporter;

c.

That payment has been made to the Clerk of the Court for the estimated
fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript

d.

That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served by Rule
20.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2015.

JAMES McMILLAN,

~ / lfu~

IA------

~omey for Plaintiff;
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. DeSmet
Ramsden & Lyons, L.L.P.
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Defendants

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

Julie Foland
Official Court Reporter
P.O. Box 9000
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000

')( U.S. Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile to:
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, 03:21 :37 PM

03:32:28 PM

I

03:33:25 PM J

Any caselaw to support this?

03:33:38 PM

Mr.
Desmet

There is case law on this, but I don't have it with me. I will find it
and submit it to Mr. McMillen

J

He is entitled to input on number of hours and work. If there is
caselaw, I'd like to see it. You can do this with no strategies are
revealed. I was given an exparte motion to stay and I previously
ruled on that. New motion to stay is really motion for
reconsideration. I don't see how I can rule on motion to stay
without reading motion for reconsideration.

Mr.
McMillen

Have agreed to move the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Attorneys Fees and Costs to 9/22/15. This is do to the birth of
my 4th child. Defendants have no desire of maintaining buildings
pending Appeal or outcome of these hearings. Based upon
position of defendants, they haven't rented out the property to
anyone else. Plaintiffs have a lot more to lose here when of Writ
of Ejection is executed.

Mr.
Desmet

This case has been going on for longer than a year now. The
plaintiffs have been squatting on the land basically. Ask court to
deny motion and ask that Writ Ejection proceed. Filing of appeal
doesn't necessarily stay the ruling. There should be a posting of
bond in the amount of the rent. I don't see any evidence of
irreparable damage.

Mr.
McMillen

Statute dates back to the 19th century. Rule of civil procedures
and appellate take precedence. IRCP 62 - gives us the authority
to stay proceedings until Appeal has been ruled upon. Amount of
bond is up to discretion of court and is not a requirement. Defis /
have not indicated any desire to rent out this land. At least enter

'

I
03:38:48 PM

I
I

I

03:41:39 PM

I

I
I

'I

/\i

Note

We will object on that basis of exparte way it was presented. I
would like opportunity to review the billing and statements.
Waives attorney client privilege usually.

I
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Mr.
McMillen

I
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II 03:35:59 PM

I
I

Location

7
(
c1lL tlt/411;

Calls case - Mr. Desmet present for the defendant. Mr. McMillen
for the plaintiff. Today we are only going to hear the motion to
stay. Motion for attorneys fees, description of hours and all of
supporting documents have been read. We will be hearing the
motion for reconsideration and motion for attorneys fees and
costs at a later date.

03:34:14 PM

I

"'I

Speaker

Time

I

Page 1 of2

Description SHOSHONE CV 2014-375 Nicholson vs CDA Placer 20150811 Motion to
"
Stay
1
Judge Mitchell
( ~11
Court Reporter Julie Foland
Clerk Jeanne Clausen
1
Date 8/11/2015

I
f

Q/11/2015
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I
03:45:30 PM

LJ
J

IJ

j

I

03:50:21 PM Mr. .
McM1llen
03:50:31 PM

~/11/2015

Page 2 of2

stay until 9/22/15. Dealing with matters this way would save
costs. Plaintiffs have established good cause to stay
.
.
proceedings.
deny motion and is brought under Rule 62(a) - no appellate court
cases that offer guidance to courts. Rule puts this on discretion
of court. Abuse of my discretion staying judgment until decision
on appeal. Reason it is an abuse, I have read motion to
reconsider, in my readings, I find that it it extremely unlikely that I
would grant that motion. By reading those briefs, it is highly
unlikely. Important to court to point out, preserving status quo
falls on deaf ears, Nicholsons have remained on property for
over a year with no legal right. Maintaining status quo is a little
repugnant. It doesn't matter what CDA Placer Mining is doing
with property. They have right to do whatever they want with
property. This doesn't enter into my decision making process.
Mr. Desmet to prepare order.
Nothing further.

I will look at caselaw, I'll submit that to court, most likely I will
Mr.Desmet waive attorney/client privilege and have Mr. McMillen look
everything and have just one hearing.
J
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Official Court Repo~_!JE UfCl$$.N6. 639
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Coeur d'Alene, IdahofB$~~0ooo
Phone: (208) 446-1130

. Email2(f$1Sf:Pkf,WV·lftH 10: 59
TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

DOCKET NO. 43440
( WILLIAM NICHOLSON, et al
(
( vs.
(
( COEUR D'ALENE PLACER
( MINING, et al

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on September 10, 2015, I lodged a transcript
of 39 pages in length, including the March 24, 2015, Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the June 22, 2015, Motion for Summary Judgment, in the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of Shoshone
in the First Judicial District.

~c/{:kf,~
UEKFOLAND
September 10, 2015
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Description SHOSHONE CV 2014-375 Nicholson vs Coeur d'Alene Placer 20151007
~~~oenMitchell
Court Reporter Julie Foland
Clerk Jeanne Clausen

Date

02:37:35 PM

PA

Gardners regularly visited the property to see what the
Nicholsens had done. Gardners waived that the consent for
improvements had to be done in writing. Writing requirement
maybe considered waived based upon the Nicholsen's conduct.
Communication to Mr. Brandstetter was only made when notice of
termination had been submitted. Agreement may have already
been breached. Lack of communication from Coeur d'Alene
Placer. Issue of the buildings. IF G's counterclaim - order granting
summary judgment to IFG. Common law ejectment matter. Legal
description is not sufficient. IRCP 7(a). Only legal description we
have is an address.

DA

We will rely on our brief in opposition. Motion for reconsideration
should be denied.

J

Denies motion for reconsideration. I have heard nothing today
that would make me change my mind. The legal description was
ruled upon previously. The complaint identifies the address. What
happened in the Answer, is zero consequence. Mr. Desmet to
prepare order. Issue of costs and fees.

DA

I have provided the fees and costs itemization which was
presented to opposing counsel and the court. The amounts
sought are reasonable.

PA

Itemized cost bill, numerous places where amounts were
reduced. Fees incurred were not reduced compared to amount of
hours. Going rate in Shoshone Co. is $150/hr.

03:00:32 PM

03:01:39 PM

n't have any evidence of that. No affidavit.
. . al.

03:03:26
03:03:40 PM

Explains that we are requesting half of the $375/hour as
clarification.

DA

03:04:28 PM

_
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02:59:01 PM
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Calls case - Mr. Desmet and Mr. McMillian are present. Reviews
documents filed in preparation for this hearing. Motion for
reconsideration.

02:47:18 PM

02:56:47 PM
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Time
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Moving party has to itemize if seeking fees on an hourly basis.
Hours spent are found to be reasonable and amount per hour is
standard. Hourly rates are certainly reasonable for Kootenai
County. What their rate are in Kootenai County is what is
('
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J

pertinent. Amount of time is reasonable. 54(a) thru (k) - nothing to
have me deviate upward or downward. I don't think I have ability
to award the.2 hours for today's hearing, but do find that you are
the prevailing party. If you want, you can submit 2 hours for today
at a later date. This has to be done as a motion and give non
moving party time to respond.

03:08:00 PM PA

Nothing further.

03:08:08 PM

Will submit an amended judgment and an order granting
attorneys' fees and order denying motion to reconsider.

03:08:31 PM

DA
End
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard

P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet) ISB #8184
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF
11-ffi STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,
v.

COEUR D'ALENE PLACER 1VIINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability

Case No. CV-2014-375

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND GRANTING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

company,

Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court on plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and
Counter-Claimant's Application for Attorney Fees and Costs and plaintiffs, William and Joan
Nicholson ("pJaintiffs") being represented by James McMillan and defendants, Coeur d'Alene
Placer Mining Corp. and Counter-Claimant IFG Timber, LLC being represented by Theron J.
De Smet, and the Court having considered the filings of the parties, the records in this matter
and the oral arguments of counse],
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING
COUNTER-CLAHvlANT' S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that CounterClaimant's Application· for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED.

Counter-

Claimant is awarded attorney fees in the amount $7,071.50, and costs as a matter of right in
the amount of $136.00 for a total of $7,207.50.
DATED this l3tday of October 2015.
<--··

itchell, District Judge

I hereby ce1iify that on the __ day of October 2015, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

us !\fail

James McMillan
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7

Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 752-1900

Z

Wallace, ID 83873

Aus Mail

Theron J. De Smet
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
700 Northwest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 664-5884

PEGGYWHIIB
CLERK OF THE DIS1RICT COURT

By

1Yw:~fA lb~

Deputy Clerk

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING
COUNTER-CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
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RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
, 700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184
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BY
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN Tiffi DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIJE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE
WILLIAM MICHAEL NICHOLSON, aka
W. :MICHAEL NICHOLSON, and JOAN
NICHOLSON, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-375

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

"·
COEUR D'ALENE PLACER MINING
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and IFG
TIMBER, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS;
Plaintiffs, WILLIAM M. NICHOLSON and JOAN NICHOLSON'S Complaint is
dismissed on the merits with prejudice.
Counterclaimant, IFG TIMBER, LLC, has prevailed on its Counterclaim and is hereby
entitled to and granted possession of the subject property, a writ of ejectment and awarded
damages in the amount of $6.16 per day from July 1, 2014 to the date of entry of this Judgment

and continuing until Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, the NichoJsons, have vacated the subject

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-1

327

V C l. I 'j.

LV I J

J : I Jr IVI

1v1

11 o. J J't O

ne1 ,, na.ynes, rr1ea1a.naer, rne.

r.

LI '+

property, with interest thereon as provided by law from the date of entry of this Judgment, until
satisfied in full.
Counter-Claimant, IFG Timber, LLC is awarded attorney fees in the amount $7,071.50,
and costs as a matter of right in the amount of $136,00, in total: $7,207.50, which shall
accrue interest thereon as provided by law from the date of entry of this Judgment until
satisfied in full.
DATED this

l'sicray of October 2015.
itchell, District Judge
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State of Idaho
County of Shoshone)
I, PEGGY WHITE, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in
and for the County of Shoshone, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and
bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents
required by Appellate Rule 28, as well as those additionally requested in the Notice of Appeal.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the Court Reporter's Transcript will be duly lodged with the Clerk of

the Supreme Court along with the Clerk's Record (which consists of two volumes) in the above entitled
cause of action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification or

admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at

Wallace, Idaho this 6th day of January, 2016.
PEGGY WHITE, lerk District Court
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SUPREME COURT NO. 43440-2015
DISTRICT COURT NO. CV-14-375

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

TO:
STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of Supreme Court; JAMES MCMILLAN for
the Appellant and MICHAEL RAMSDEN for the Respondent:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that I have personally served or mailed, by
certified United States mail, one copy of the Clerks Record (consisting of two volumes)
along with one copy of the Court Reporter's Transcript in the above entitled cause upon
each of the following:
JAMES MCMILLAN
Attorney at Law
415 Seventh St, Suite 7
Wallace ID 83873

MICHAEL RAMSDEN
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho
Appellate Rules, all parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file
objections to the Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the
event no objections are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be
deemed settled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court this 6th day of January, 2016.

lerk District Court
-f-1--4!:M-~~H-L~~!_L_~-==--Deputy

330
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - PG I

